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No. 20070197 
IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT 
PAUL HOUGHTON, et al., 
Plaintiffs/Petitioners and Appellants, 
vs. 
DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, THE OFFICE OF RECOVERY 
SERVICES, DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN SERVICES AND 
STATE OF UTAH, et al, 
Defendants/Respondents and Appellees. 
APPELLEES' BRIEF 
JURISDICTION 
This Court has jurisdiction over appeals from orders of any court 
of record over which the Court of Appeals does not have original 
appellate jurisdiction. Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(j) (West 2004). On May 
29, 2007, this Court entered an order that provisionally granted 
Plaintiffs' petition for interlocutory appeal from the trial court's Order 
on Motion for Decertification (Decertification Order). 
ISSUES PRESENTED 
I. T i m e l i n e s s o f P e t i t i o n 
The trial court entered the Decertification Order on December 22, 
2006. After the twenty-day time period for a petition for interlocutory 
appeal expired, the trial court entered a minute entry stating tha t the 
order was "provisional." In a February 2007 order, the trial court said 
that the Decertification Order was now "final," but made no changes or 
modifications to it. Does this Court have jurisdiction to review the 
Decertification Order? 
A. Standard of review 
This issue requires no review of the lower court decision; thus, no 
standard of review applies. 
B. Preservation of issue 
This issue is unique to the interlocutory appeal; thus, the 
preservation requirement does not apply. 
II. C l a s s D e c e r t i f i c a t i o n 
Utah R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3) requires tha t questions of law and fact 
that are common to class members predominate over those questions 
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affecting only individual members. The trial court ruled that the 
calculation of the attorney fees amount the State must pay to Medicaid 
recipients destroyed the predominance of common questions due to the 
fact-intensive inquiries into each member's individual case. Did the 
* trial court err by decertifying the class? 
A Standard of review 
Whether to certify or decertify a class is within the sound 
discretion of the trial court. Richardson v. Ariz. Fuels Corp., 614 P.2d 
636, 639 (Utah 1980). 
B. Preservation of issue 
Defendants raised this issue in their Motion for Decertification of 
Class Action Status, R. 1293-95, and in their Renewed Motion for 
Decertification of Class Action Status, R. 2087-88. The trial court 
entered the Decertification Order on December 22, 2006. R. 4194-4248. 
Plaintiffs filed a petition for interlocutory review on March 7, 2007. 
And this Court provisionally granted the petition on May 29, 2007. R. 
4319-21. 
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III. "Related Questions" of Class Criteria and Discovery 
The Court did not accept either of Plaintiffs' "Related Questions" 
when it provisionally granted Plaintiffs' petition for interlocutory 
appeal. But in any event, the "related questions" have already been 
addressed. This Court set out the elements of an attorney fees claim 
under Utah Code Ann. § 26-19-7 in Houghton v. Dep't of Health, 2005 
UT 63, l^ 51, 125 P.3d 860. And the trial court ordered the State to 
provide Plaintiffs with "all third party liability case files from November 
1, 1994 to present where the Medicaid recipient was represented by a 
private attorney and the State satisfied its lien." R. 2165. Should this 
Court address the two "Related Questions?" 
A. Standard of review 
Neither of those two issues is properly before the Court, nor does 
either require review of the lower court's decision. Thus, no standard of 
review applies. 
B. Preservation of issue 
Neither of those two issues is properly before the Court. Nor did 
Plaintiffs preserve the issues for interlocutory appeal. 
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DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL 
PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES 
Utah R. App. P. 5 and Utah R. Civ. P. 23 are attached as addendum A. 
Utah Code Ann. § 26-19-7 (West 2004) is attached as addendum B. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
This case arises from Plaintiffs' suit against the Department of 
Health, other state agencies, and two individual defendants alleging 
that Utah's Medicaid lien statute, Utah Code Ann. § 26-19-5(1), violated 
federal law. Class certification was granted early in the proceedings. 
During the course of this lawsuit, this Court determined that 
Utah's lien statute did not violate federal law. See S.S. v. State of Utah, 
972 P.2d 439 (Utah 1998); Wallace v. Estate ofNichole Jackson, 972 P.2d 
446 (Utah 1998). This Court also determined that Medicaid recipients 
could recover attorney fees from the State unless the State satisfied its 
lien through its own efforts. See State of Utah v. McCoy, 2000 UT 39, 
999 P.2d 572; Houghton v. Dep't of Health, 2005 UT 63, 125 P.3d 860 
(Houghton III). 
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Following Houghton IIly the State renewed its earlier motion to 
decertify the class. Plaintiffs opposed the motion and argued that the 
State must pay a fee of 33% in every case where the recipient asked for 
the State's consent, whether or not the State already paid a fee or 
discounted its lien. 
After briefing and argument, the trial court rejected Plaintiffs' 
argument tha t contingency fees are always 33% of the recovery and also 
that the proper amount of fees the State must pay could be calculated by 
a simple mathematical formula.1 Instead, the court ruled that each 
recipient will have to prove the appropriate amount of fees owed. Based 
on that conclusion, the trial court ruled that the Rule 23 criteria for 
class actions was not satisfied and decertified the class. 
Course of the Proceedings and Disposition Below 
Plaintiffs filed their Complaint on October 27, 1995, alleging that 
Utah's Medicaid lien statute violated federal law. R. 1-47. The trial 
court certified two classes on January 29, 1996. R. 98-101. On 
1
 That formula would require the State to pay the recipient 33% 
of its recovery to reimburse the recipient for the attorney fees that the 
recipient paid his or her attorney. 
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December 22, 2006, after all the claims, except one, had been dismissed, 
the trial court decertified the class. R. 4194-4248 {Decertification Order). 
After the twenty-day deadline to file an interlocutory appeal, the 
trial court entered a minute entry that said the Decertification Order 
4 was "provisional." R. 4254. On February 15, 2007, the trial court 
entered an order that did not change or modify the Decertification 
Order, but that said it was now "final." R. 4291-95. Plaintiffs filed a 
direct appeal of the Decertification Order on March 19, 2007 (Appellate 
Docket No. 20070252). R. 4300-01. That appeal was dismissed on June 
20,2007. 
The trial court denied Plaintiffs' Rule 54(b) motion to certify the 
Decertification Order on March 29, 2007. R. 4307& 4312-15. Plaintiffs 
filed their Petition for Interlocutory Appeal on March 7, 2007, and this 
Court provisionally granted permission to appeal on May 29, 2007. R. 
4319-21. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On October 27, 1995, four named plaintiffs sued the Department 
of Health, the Office of Recovery Services, the Department of Human 
Services, the State of Utah and two individual defendants for civil rights 
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and other claims alleging that Utah's Medicaid lien statute violated 
federal law. R. 1-6, 22, 24-25, 32-47. 
On January 29, 1996, the trial court certified two classes in the 
case. The court noted that the common question of law or fact to the 
classes was "whether or not the State of Utah violated federal law in 
asserting liens on claims, settlements and judgments of class members 
to reimburse itself for Medicaid assistance paid." R. 98-101. 
Subsequently, the State moved for judgment on the pleadings 
based on two 1998 Utah Supreme Court decisions tha t held tha t the 
lien statute did not violate federal law. R. 430-31. The trial court 
denied tha t motion, R. 494-95, and the litigation continued. In 2002, 
this Court extinguished the claims of one of the classes and stated tha t 
the only remaining claim was an implied cause of action for attorney 
fees. Houghton v. Dep't of Health, 2002 UT 101, 57 P.3d 1067 {Houghton 
II). On remand, Judge Ronald E. Nehring, the presiding judge at the 
time, expressed his opinion tha t attorney fees in each third-party 
liability case would have to be determined on the merits and tha t it 
would be a "fact intensive enterprise." R. 1310-22 & 1798 {Transcript of 
04/28/2003 Hearing, pp. 86-87). 
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The statute governing payment of attorney fees during most of the 
relevant time period, Utah Code Ann. § 26-19-7 (West 2004),2 did not 
require the State to pay the same attorney fees in every case. R. 4210. 
In 2000, this Court determined that the State was required to pay 
reasonable attorney fees if it satisfied its lien from the proceeds 
procured by the recipient's attorney. McCoy, 2000 UT 39 at H19. 
The State filed its first motion to decertify the class in 2003. R. 
1293-95. That motion was stayed during Plaintiffs' interlocutory appeal 
over discovery issues. Houghton III, 2005 UT 63. In December 2005, 
this Court issued Houghton III, which outlined the elements of a McCoy 
attorney fees claim, and the case was remanded. R. 1971-94. After 
remand, the State renewed its motion to decertify in February 2006. R. 
2087-88. 
In an attempt to determine whether the case should continue as a 
class action, the trial court ordered the State to produce one hundred 
third-party liability case files. R. 2047-50, 4337. Those files did not 
2
 The relevant statutory language provided: 
(4) The department may not pay more than 33% of its total recovery 
for attorney's fees, but shall pay a proportionate share of the costs in 
an action that is commenced with the department's written consent. 
Utah Code Ann. § 26-19-7(4) (West 2004). 
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provide enough information to determine whether the class met the 
requirements for continued certification. R. 2163. Plaintiffs asked the 
trial court for access to more of the files, and the trial court ordered the 
State to produce "all third party liability case files from November 1, 
1994 to present where the Medicaid recipient was represented by a 
private attorney and the State satisfied its lien." R. 2165. 
In compliance with that order, between June 15 and July 10, 2006, 
the State produced 2,785 third-party liability case files for Plaintiffs to 
inspect and copy. R. 2288, 2783-93, 2799 & 2812. Plaintiffs had 
unlimited access to the 2,785 case files; their inspection team consisted 
of up to five individuals who were allowed complete access to inspect, 
copy, or scan any files they chose. R. 2783-93 & 3858-59. The process 
concluded only when Plaintiffs were finished inspecting, copying and 
scanning the files they chose. R. 3859. 
Ultimately, Plaintiffs chose to copy or scan only 412 case files. R. 
2812. The files fall into the following categories: 1) Potential Houghton 
III cases where consent was requested and denied (28 cases), R. 2812 & 
2830-3356; and 2) cases tha t do not have the Houghton III elements for 
a McCoy attorney fee claim (384 cases). Those cases lacking the 
elements can be broken down as follows: a) consent was granted and an 
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attorney fee paid or discount given (314 cases); b) no request for consent 
was made (31 cases); c) the recipient did not have an attorney (19 cases); 
d) there was no-fault insurance coverage, for which attorney 
representation was unnecessary (11 cases); e) the recipient's attorney 
declined to enter into a collection agreement (4 cases); and f) cases that 
could not be categorized by the case notes alone (5 cases). R. 2812-19, 
3859 & 4168-4182. The information necessary to determine potential 
recipients who may have a McCoy attorney fees claim is contained in the 
electronic files. R. 2830-3350. 
Plaintiffs submitted affidavits to the trial court stating that, in 
Salt Lake City, attorney fees for personal injury cases are typically one-
third of the gross recovery but that attorneys occasionally take a lower 
or higher fee depending upon the circumstances of the case. R. 3779-80 
(Affidavit of Colin P. King, pp. 2-3) & 3785-86 (Affidavit ofG. Steven 
Sullivan, pp. 2-3). The trial judge noted that in his experience, the 
percentage of attorney fees in a personal injury case is often "25% or 
some other percentage than 33%" and that a 33% fee "is not so prevalent 
that a presumption of 33% should be given." R. 4210 & 4236 
(Decertification Order, p. 17, n.7 & p. 43, n.19). 
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The governing statute, Utah Code Ann. § 26-19-7 (West 2004), 
granted the State discretion to determine an attorney fee, but prohibited 
the State from paying more than 33%. R. 2827 & 4210. The State 
considered a number of factors in determining the attorney fees to be 
paid, including: a) whether the recipient requested the State's consent to 
represent its interest; b) whether the recipient's attorney cooperated 
with the State; c) the underlying basis and nature of the third-party 
liability claim; d) whether liability was contested; e) whether causation 
was contested; f) whether there were damages issues involved; g) the 
amount of the Medicaid lien; h) the amount of the recipient's recovery; i) 
whether suit was filed; and j) whether the State could have procured 
reimbursement itself with little or no effort. R. 2827-28 {Affidavit of 
Brent Perry, %8). After their inspection of the 2,785 third-party liability 
case files, Plaintiffs conceded tha t the State granted consent and paid 
attorney fees or discounted its lien3 in the "overwhelming number of 
cases." R. 3470 & 3484. 
3
 In cases where the State discounted its lien, the recipient 
received a larger portion of the settlement and was therefore 
reimbursed for the State's part of the attorney fees that the recipient 
paid to the attorney. 
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When discovery was complete, the trial court allowed 
supplemental briefing on the decertification motion. R. 2807-3356. 
After full briefing and oral argument, the trial court entered the 
Decertification Order on December 22, 2006. R. 4194-4248. Plaintiffs' 
counsel sent the trial judge a letter on January 9, 2007, expressing his 
uncertainty regarding the correct time to appeal. R. 4249-50. On 
January 12, 2007, after the twenty-day time period to seek permission to 
file an interlocutory appeal expired, the trial court entered a minute 
entry stating that the Decertification Order should be considered 
"provisional." R. 4254. 
In the months before the Decertification Order, Plaintiffs filed 
numerous other motions in the case.4 None are relevant to this appeal, 
and one remains pending before the trial court. R. 2207-09, 2660-61, 
2672-74, 2677-82, 2755-57, 3371-72.5 
4
 Those motions include: 1) motions to amend the complaint and 
to reinstate claims of Class I and Class II Plaintiffs; 2) for attorney fees; 
3) for prejudgment interest; 4) for sanctions for spoliation of evidence 
and 5) for the trial court to find that Plaintiffs' claims are equitable in 
nature. 
5
 Plaintiffs spend considerable amount of time arguing that the 
State has destroyed evidence that is crucial to them. But Plaintiffs 
have never shown that the hard copy files are the exclusive source of 
the evidence necessary to establish the Houghton III elements. R. 
2798-99 Importantly, the information recorded in the case files was not 
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Following a January 2007 oral argument on Plaintiffs' various 
other motions, the trial court directed the State's counsel to prepare the 
court's order on those motions. R. 4337. At no time did the State or its 
counsel "assure" Plaintiffs or their counsel that the character of the 
Decertification Order could be changed. R. 4337 {Transcript of 
01123/2007 Hearing, pp. 62-63). 
On February 15, 2007, the trial court signed the prepared order. 
The order did not change or modify the Decertification Order, but it 
stated that the Decertification Order was now "final." R. 4291-95. 
Plaintiffs filed a Notice of Appeal on March 19, 2007 (Appellate 
Docket No. 20070252). R. 4300-01. That appeal was dismissed on June 
20, 2007. The trial court denied Plaintiffs' Rule 54(b) motion to certify 
the Decertification Order on March 29, 2007. R. 4307& 4312-15. 
Plaintiffs filed their Petition for Interlocutory Appeal on March 7, 
2007, and this Court provisionally granted permission to appeal on May 
29,2007. R. 4319-21. 
recorded in anticipation of or intended to address the issues in either 
the McCoy or Houghton III decisions. In the few cases where the 
Houghton III elements cannot be determined from the electronic files, 
other sources of information will likely be available to prove or disprove 
the elements. The alleged evidence destruction is not relevant to the 
issues currently before the Court. 
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SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
This Court lacks jurisdiction over this appeal because Plaintiffs' 
petition for interlocutory appeal was untimely. The trial court entered 
the Decertification Order on December 22, 2006. After the twenty-day 
period to file a petition for interlocutory appeal expired, the trial court 
entered a minute entry stating that order was "provisional." Then in 
February 2007, the trial court entered an order stating that the 
Decertification Order was now "final." But that February order did not 
change or modify the Decertification Order, and therefore, it did not 
enlarge the time for Plaintiffs to file their petition for interlocutory 
review of the Decertification Order. 
Next, the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it 
decertified the class. Rule 23(b)(3) requires that the factual and legal 
issues that are common to the class "predominate" over issues that 
affect only individual class members. Here, the calculation of the proper 
amount of attorney fees that the State is obligated to pay Medicaid 
recipients is too case-specific for the common questions to predominate. 
The trial court cannot calculate the fee amounts by applying a simple 
mathematical formula because the governing statute does not allow it. 
The State had broad discretion to determine a fee, and did so based on a 
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variety of factors. Necessarily then, the fee calculation will result in a 
series of mini-trials, which defeats the judicial economy class actions 
provide. The trial court properly applied the Rule 23 criteria to the facts 
of the case, and its decision to decertify the class should not be disturbed 
because the decision did not exceed the trial court's discretion. 
Last, Plaintiffs' two "Related Questions" should be ignored. 
Neither was accepted by the Court for interlocutory review. Even if they 
had been, it is not necessary to address either question. First, the 
Houghton III court clearly set out the elements of a McCoy attorney fees 
claim. Second, Plaintiffs' access to the 2,785 third-party liability files 
was not limited. After initially allowing Plaintiffs access to only one 
hundred of the files, the trial court ordered the State to give Plaintiffs 
access to all of the files. Plaintiffs' inspection team was free to inspect, 
copy or scan any files it wanted and ultimately chose to copy only 412 
files. 
ARGUMENT 
I. The Court Lacks Jurisdiction over the Untimely 
Petition for Interlocutory Appeal. 
Plaintiffs' petition for interlocutory appeal was untimely, and 
therefore the Court lacks jurisdiction to review the merits of the 
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Decertification Order. Plaintiffs argue first that the trial court's minute 
entry, stating that the December order was "provisional," was entered 
within the twenty-day time period because of the additional three-day 
mailing time provided by Utah R. App. P. 22.(d). Plaintiffs are wrong. 
Rule 22(d) extends time only when the party "is required or permitted to 
do an act within a prescribed period after service of a paper and the 
paper is served by mail." (Emphasis added). In other words, Rule 22 
extends the time to act when the time runs from the service of the 
particular paper. But Utah R. App. 5 is clear that a petition must be 
filed twenty days after entry of the order. Rule 22(d) does not apply 
here. See, e.g., State v. Palmer, 111 P.2d 521, 521 (Utah App. 1989); 
Carsten v. Carsten, 2006 WL 1791391 (Utah App.) (Attached as part of 
addendum C). The twenty-day period for Plaintiffs to file their petition 
for interlocutory appeal expired on January 11, 2007, not on January 16, 
2007, as Plaintiffs assert. 
Under Rule 5's plain language, this Court lacks jurisdiction over 
this appeal because it was untimely filed. The trial judge signed the 
Decertification Order on December 22, 2006, and the docket shows that 
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the clerk entered the order on the same day.6 R. 4194-4248. The "entry 
of the order" occurred, therefore, on December 22, 2006 See Utah R. Civ. 
P. 58A(c). Rule 5(a) requires a petition to be filed within twenty days 
after the entry of the order. Applying Rule 5 here required Plaintiffs to 
file their petition within twenty days of December 22, 2006. 
Alternatively, Plaintiffs could have moved the trial court for an 
extension of time before the expiration of the twenty days. Plaintiffs did 
neither. 
Instead, two days before the deadline, Plaintiffs' counsel faxed a 
letter to the trial judge, expressing his uncertainty regarding the correct 
time to appeal. R. 4249-50. On January 12, 2007, after expiration of 
the time, the trial court recharacterized the Decertification Order in a 
minute entry stating that it "should be considered provisional." At a 
hearing in January 2007, the court directed the State's attorney to 
prepare an order stating, in part, tha t the Decertification Order "is now 
a final order." The order was signed on February 15, 2007. 
The confusion arises because Plaintiffs appeal the December 
Decertification Order on its merits, arguing that it was not "final" until 
6
 Although it would be expected to see the clerk's date-stamp on 
the original Decertification Order, one is not there. But, the entry date 
of December 22, 2006, appears on the court's docket. 
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February 2007. This Court's order provisionally granting permission for 
this interlocutory appeal observed that the February order made no 
changes to the Decertification Order. Plaintiffs argue that the order 
was modified because it changed from a "provisional" order to a "final" 
order. That argument should fail. First, interlocutory orders are always 
subject to change and, accordingly, can never be considered "final" in the 
proper legal sense.7 
Second, this Court has rejected similar arguments in cases 
involving an amended judgment. "Where a belated entry merely 
constitutes an amendment or modification not changing the substance 
or character of the judgment, such entry is merely a nunc pro tunc entry 
which relates back to the time the original judgment was entered, and 
does not enlarge the time for appeal. . . ." State v. Garner, 2005 UT 6, f 
7
 An interlocutory order, by definition, is never "final" in the 
legal sense. For purposes of appeal, a final order "ends the litigation on 
the merits and leaves nothing for the court to do but execute the 
judgment." Crosland v. Peck, 738 P.2d 631, 632 (Utah 1987); Anderson 
u. Wilshire Investments Corp., 2005 UT 59, %9, 123 P.3d 393; Loffredo v. 
Holt, 2001 UT 97, f 12, 37 P.3d 1070. The Decertification Order can not 
become "final" until judgment is entered in the case. This distinction is 
important because the trial court's February order declaring the 
Decertification Order "final" did not change the legal character of the 
Decertification Order. Because the later order neither changed nor 
modified the Decertification Order, it is difficult to see how the 
February order could have had any legal effect on the Decertification 
Order. 
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11, 106 P.3d 729; Beddoes u. Giffin, 2007 UT 35, f 12, 158 P.2d 1102; 
Promax Dev. Corp. v. Raile, 2000 UT 4, f 12, 998 P.2d 254; Adamson v. 
Brockbank, 112 Utah 52, 185 P.2d 264 (1947). The key issue is whether 
the trial court made material modifications to the order. For example, 
in Garner, a notation on the judgment that the defendant's plea was 
conditional was not material, and the time for appeal was not enlarged. 
2005 UT 6 at % 11. In Promax Development, the subsequent change in 
the judgment tha t entered an award of attorney fees was material and 
did enlarge the time for appeal. 2000 UT 4 at f 12. Here, the 
Decertification Order was neither changed nor modified. Thus, the entry 
of the February order did not enlarge the time for interlocutory appeal of 
the Decertification Order. 
Plaintiffs' attempt to have the Court review the merits of the 
Decertification Order through the February order should fail. The 
situation is analogous to the Court's jurisprudence governing appeals 
from a denial of a Rule 60(b) motion for relief from judgment. On 
appeal, appellate courts will consider only the trial court's decision to 
grant or deny relief from judgment, and will not consider the merits of 
the case. See Fisher v. Bybee, 2004 UT 92, fl 11, 104 P.3d 1198; Lange v. 
Eby, 2006 UT App. 118, f7, 133 P.3d 451; Franklin Covey Client Sales, 
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Inc. v. Meluin, 2000 UT App. 110, f 19, 23, 2 R3d 451. Following that 
reasoning, because the merits of the Decertification Order were not 
modified or altered by the February order, Plaintiffs were required to 
appeal the Decertification Order itself in order for this Court to review it 
on the merits. Because Plaintiffs did not timely file their petition for 
interlocutory review of the Decertification Order, the Court lacks 
jurisdiction to hear this appeal.8 
Plaintiffs argue that the appeal should be allowed for equitable 
reasons. See Appellants' Brief at p. 17. Although equity does not support 
Plaintiffs' argument,9 the Court cannot hear a case for equitable reasons 
8
 The decision in Code v. Dep't of Health, 2007 UT 43, \ \ 8-9, 162 
P.3d 1097, does not control this issue. Code states that in order to 
trigger the time to file an appeal, the prevailing party must submit an 
order or the court must give the parties explicit direction that no order 
is required. Id. The rule does not apply here because the appeal in 
Code was taken from a final order instead of an interlocutory one. 
Code's intention is to avoid barring a person's rights to a final appeal. 
Here, Plaintiffs will not lose the right to appeal at the end of the case. 
Apparently recognizing the inapplicability of Code, Plaintiffs do not 
even mention it. 
9
 Plaintiffs claim that they relied on defense counsel's "assurance" 
that the December 22 order was not final. But neither the State nor its 
counsel ever assured Plaintiffs their petition was timely or that the 
character of the December order could be changed. The only reference 
to any "assurance" by defense counsel is that the State's counsel 
prepared the February 15, 2007 order, as requested by the trial court. 
It would not have been proper for the State to include its disagreement 
with the trial court's conclusion that the December order was now 
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if it does not have jurisdiction in the first instance. See, e.g., Crump v. 
Crump, 821 P.2d 1172, 1173 (Utah App. 1991); see generally 5 C. Wright 
& A. Miller Federal Practice and Procedure § 1350 (1969). Utah R. App. 
P. 2 allows the appellate court to suspend the appellate rules' 
requirements on its own motion or when extraordinary cause is shown 
in a particular case, except as to the provisions of Rules 4(a), 4(b), 4(e), 
5(a), 48, 52, and 59. The advisory committee note explicitly states tha t 
those provisions establish "procedures and time limits tha t confer 
jurisdiction upon the court." Because Rule 5(a) prohibits this Court 
from asserting jurisdiction over this case, the Court should not reach the 
merits of the appeal. Likewise, because Rule 2 specifically prohibits this 
Court from suspending or modifying Rule 5(a)'s requirements, the Court 
cannot allow this appeal for equitable reasons. See Peres-Llamas v. 
Utah Court of Appeals, 2005 UT 18, f 11, 110 P.3d 706 (Rule 2 cannot 
extend time to file an appeal); Dent v. Dent, 2005 UT App. 568, f 7, 127 
P.3d 1292 (same). 
Finally, policy favors adhering to a strict time limit for 
interlocutory appeals. This Court has suggested that, in general, 
"final" in the February order its counsel prepared. See also R. 4337 
(Transcript of 0112312007 Hearing, pp. 62-63). 
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interlocutory appeals should be avoided because "they present appellate 
courts with multiple appeals involving narrow issues taken out of the 
context of the whole case which slow down the final determination of the 
matter." Kennecott Corp. v. Utah State Tax Commn, 814 P.2d 1099, 
1101 (1991). Nonetheless, because there are circumstances when an 
interlocutory appeal is necessary, Rule 5 imposes a strict, jurisdictional 
time period for such appeals. The "purpose for the shorter time frame 
for interlocutory appeals is the need to expedite the process and avoid 
unnecessary delay in the pending litigation." Bayless v. Bayless, 580 
N.E.2d 962 (Ind. Ct. App. 1991). 
Ultimately, both the text of Rule 5 and its policy support the 
conclusion tha t the twenty-day time period should be strictly enforced. 
Plaintiffs filed their petition after the time expired. They did not move 
for an enlargement of the time, and the later order did not modify the 
December Decertification Order. Thus, this Court lacks jurisdiction to 
review it. 
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II. The Trial Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion When It 
Decertified the Class. 
The Court accepted, on interlocutory appeal, only the question of 
whether the trial court erred by decertifying the class. Yet, Plaintiffs' 
brief fails to discuss Utah R. Civ. P. 23, which governs class actions, or 
its application in connection with the Decertification Order. Plaintiffs 
also fail to provide the Court with the proper standard of review. That 
standard, abuse of discretion, is crucial to the analysis. 
The question of whether to allow a suit to proceed as a class 
action is one primarily for the trial court. "If the criteria of Rule 23 are 
complied with, it is within the sound discretion of the district court to 
determine whether a su i t . . . should proceed as a class action." 
Richardson, 614 P.2d at 639; see also Call v. City of West Jordan, 727 
P.2d 180, 183 (Utah 1986). The trial court has the same discretion to 
decertify a class, and a class should be decertified if it no longer meets 
the Rule 23 criteria. See Richardson, 614 P.2d at 639. 
Only when the trial court's decision exceeds the "limits of 
reasonability" will an appellate court find tha t a trial court abused its 
discretion, or more properly, exceeded the bounds of its discretion. 
Turville v. J & J Properties, L.C., 2006 UT App. 305, f 25, 145 P.3d 
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1146. Indeed, this Court has stated that an abuse of discretion will be 
found only when "no reasonable [person] would take the view adopted by 
the trial court." State v. Gerrard, 584 P.2d 885, 887 (Utah 1978). In 
other words, an "abuse of discretion occurs when a judicial 
determination is arbitrary, capricious or whimsical. It is not merely an 
error of law or judgment, but an overriding of the law by the exercise of 
manifestly unreasonable judgment." United States v. Wright, 826 F.2d 
938, 943 (10th Cir. 1987). When viewed in light of the required class-
action criteria, the trial court's decision to decertify the class was not an 
abuse of discretion. 
Rule 23(a) provides the four initial requirements for all class 
actions: numerosity, commonality, typicality, and adequacy of 
representation. In addition to those initial four 23(a) requirements, 
Rule 23(b) provides two additional requirements for class certification.10 
First, the court must find that common issues of law or fact 
"predominate" over questions affecting only individual members. 
Second, the court must find that a class action is "superior to other 
available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of the 
10
 The parties have agreed that if the class is to continue, it must 
be under Rule 23(b)(3). R. 98-101; R. 1307; R. 4228. 
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controversy." Utah R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3). 
Here, the trial court carefully applied the Rule 23 criteria to the 
facts and rendered a well-reasoned and lengthy order that was well 
within the bounds of the court's discretion. In fact, it would have been 
an abuse of discretion not to decertify the class. This Court should 
affirm the Decertification Order. 
Rule 23(b)(3)'s predominance requirement . 
The trial court assumed that the Rule 23(a) numerosity 
requirement11 was satisfied. R. 4230. So, the deciding class certification 
factor12 is whether "the questions of law or fact common to the members 
of the class predominate over any questions affecting only individual 
members " Utah R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3). Satisfying Rule 23(b)(3)'s 
predominance requirement is "far more demanding" than meeting the 
Rule 23(a) commonality requirement. Achem Prods, v. Windsor, 521 
U.S. 591, 624 (1997)(construing the identical language of Fed. R. Civ. P. 
23). 
11
 The State does not agree that numerosity is present. R. 2820-
21. 
12
 The parties have not disputed that class representatives have 
typical claims or that they will adequately protect the interests of the 
class. See Utah R. Civ. P. 23(a)(3) and (4). 
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The remaining claim in the case is Plaintiff Medicaid recipients' 
claim for attorney fees under Utah Code Ann. § 26-19-7(4) (West 2004). 
This Court recognized the claim in McCoy, 2000 UT 39 at f 20, and 
defined the claim's elements in Houghton III.13 The State is liable to 
contribute to the recipient's attorney fees, if the recipient proves: 1) an 
attorney represented the recipient in a third-party liability claim; 2) the 
recipient asked for consent to represent the State's interest in obtaining 
recovery of amounts Medicaid paid on the recipient's behalf; 3) the State 
denied consent; 4) the recipient obtained a recovery; and 5) the State 
satisfied its Medicaid lien from the proceeds obtained by the recipient's 
attorney. Thus, the resulting common questions tha t must be answered 
are the factual and legal ones tha t define the McCoy claim. 
13
 The Houghton HI court defined the McCoy elements thus: 
Under the general holding of McCoy, the State is obligated 
to pay its share of a recipient's private attorney fees if 
either (1) the State consents to the recipient's request to 
represent its interest; or (2) the State satisfies its lien from 
proceeds procured through the efforts of a recipient's 
private attorney in those cases where the recipient 
requested, but was denied, consent. 
Houghton III, 2005 UT 63 at f 51. Both the McCoy and Houghton 
III opinions are attached to the brief in Addendum C. 
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First, the trial court correctly recognized that some cases will 
require individual determinations about whether a private attorney 
represented the Medicaid recipient. R. 4204. While in most cases that 
is a simple question, there are some in which the attorney withdrew 
from representation before the recipient and the liable third-party 
reached a settlement. R.4232. In those cases, case-specific evidence 
will be required to determine whether the State owes the recipient any 
attorney fees. 
Second, the trial court correctly recognized that some cases will 
require individual questions about whether the recipient asked for the 
State's consent. R. 4204-08. The parties strongly disagree about how 
many of those cases there are. R. 2820-21 & 3471-76. The trial court 
will have to receive evidence and make individual factual 
determinations about consent in each of those disputed cases. 
Third, the trial court correctly recognized and focused on the most 
important question: the determination of attorney fees. R. 4209-22. The 
appropriate amount of fees that the State owes to individual Medicaid 
recipients cannot be calculated by a simple mathematical formula. And, 
contrary to Plaintiffs' assertions, nothing in the governing statute or 
case law requires resort to a simple mathematical formula or an across-
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the-board 33% for attorney fees.14 
During most of the relevant time period, the statute governing 
payment of attorney fees gave the State discretion to fix an attorney fee, 
but set a ceiling on the amount : 
(4) The department may not pay more than 33% of its total 
recovery for attorney's fees, but shall pay a proportionate 
share of the costs in an action that is commenced with the 
department's written consent. 
Utah Code Ann. § 26-19-7 (West 2004) (emphasis added). The beginning 
point in any question of statutory construction is the statute's plain 
wording. Hall v. Dep't ofCorr., 2001 UT 34, f 15, 24 P.3d 958; Chris & 
Dicks Lumber & Hardware v. Tax Comm'n, 791 P.2d 511, 514 (Utah 
1990). The legislature's use of the word "may" granted the State 
discretion to determine the attorney fee to be paid in a given case. The 
statute plainly says that the State may pay 33%, and may pay less than 
33%, but may not pay more than 33%. 
When construing statutes, courts routinely assume that the 
legislature used each word advisedly. E.g., Grant v. Utah State Land 
14
 Judge Quinn rejected Plaintiffs' assertion that contingency fee 
agreements are always 33%. He stated that, in his experience, the 
percentage of attorney fees in personal injury is often "25% or some 
other percentage than 33%" and that a 33% fee "is not so prevalent that 
a presumption of 33% should be given." R. 4210 & 4236 
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Bd., 26 Utah 2d 100, 102, 485 P.2d 1035 (1971). Notably, the legislature 
chose the word "may" in the first clause dealing with attorney fees, but 
chose the word "shall" when dealing with costs after an action has been 
filed. The discretion granted with the word "may" is made clear by its 
juxtaposition to the word "shall." Jama v. Immigration & Customs 
Enforcement, 543 U.S. 335, 346 (2005). "May," in its most usual 
meaning, does not import certainty. The words "shall" or "must" make 
mandatory intention clear. Grant, 485 P.2d at 1036-37; see also Haig v. 
Agee, 453 U.S. 280, 294 n 26 (1981) ("may" expressly recognizes 
substantial discretion); Crockett v. Crockett, 836 P.2d 818, 820 (Utah 
App. 1992) (under ordinary construction the word "may" means 
permissive). Plaintiffs would have this Court exceed its power and 
rewrite the statute to say tha t the State "shall" pay 33% in all cases. 
But this Court has "no power to rewrite a s tatute to make it conform to 
an intention not expressed." Neel v. State, 889 P.2d 922, 926 (Utah 
1995). 
Moreover, the significance of "may" is also made clear by the 2005 
amendment to § 26-19-7, which provides that the State "shall pay 
attorney's fees at the rate of 33.3% of the department's total recovery 
and shall pay a proportionate share of the litigation expenses directly 
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related to the action." Utah Code Ann. § 26-19-7 (West Supp. 2007). By 
amendment, the legislature took away the State's discretion to fix an 
attorney fee. That change in statutory language would not have been 
necessary if, as Plaintiffs suggest, the statute's prior version required 
the State to pay a fee of 33% in all cases. 
The language of the statute is clear and unambiguous. The State 
had authority to negotiate a fee up to 33% of its total recovery. The 
negotiated fee was variable and depended upon many factors; each case 
was considered on its own facts. R. 2826 {Affidavit of Brent Perry \ 8). 
Thus, the calculation of the State's share of each recipient's attorney fee 
will be as varied as each recipient's individual case. Therefore, the 
common questions of law and fact do not predominate over the 
individual case questions. Accordingly, the class was properly 
decertified, and the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it did 
so. 
Nothing in either the McCoy or Houghton III decisions requires a 
different result. Nor do those cases demand that the State pay a flat 
33% fee in every case. McCoy held that the State was entitled to satisfy 
its lien from the proceeds procured by the recipient's attorney, but it also 
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held that, if the State did so, it was responsible to pay "reasonable'' 
attorney fees: 
In sum, while the Act provides discretion to the State 
when selecting a suitable avenue for recovering medical 
assistance, each method of recovery requires the State to 
pay its share of attorney fees. The State may (1) take 
action directly against the third party, for which the 
State pays its own expenses; (2) grant consent to recipients 
seeking to pursue the State's claim, whereby the State's 
recovery will be reduced by reasonable attorney fees and, 
if any, its proportionate share of the costs of an action; 
or (3) refuse consent and proceed against the recipient after 
the recipient recovers from the third party, in which case the 
State's recovery shall be reduced by reasonable attorney fees. 
McCoy, 2000 UT 39 at f 19 (emphasis added). Moreover, although the 
precise amount of the State's claim was expressly discussed in the 
decision ($8,846.92), the McCoy court neither deducted 33% for the 
recipient's attorney fee, nor directed the trial court to do so. Instead, the 
McCoy court remanded case to the trial court for a determination of the 
"reasonable" attorney fees to be awarded: 
We affirm the judgment of the trial court to the extent it 
held tha t the State is entitled to recover $8,846.92 from 
McCoy, but reverse to the extent the court failed to reduce 
the State's recovery by McCoy's reasonable attorney fees 
for procuring the State's share of the settlement proceeds. 
We therefore remand for a determinat ion of attorney 
fees to be awarded McCoy and other appropriate action 
consistent with this opinion. 
Id. at f 20 (emphasis added). 
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Similarly, Houghton III did not require the State to pay each 
Medicaid recipient a 33% attorney fee. The Houghton III court sought 
"to clarify the holding of McCoy as it relates to the scope of a discovery 
order concerning potential class members." Houghton III, 2005 UT 63 at 
\ 38. The Court stated that the question left open by McCoy was 
"whether the State's obligation to pay its fair share of attorney fees is 
limited to cases exactly like McCoy, where the recipient expressly 
excluded the State's claim and the State recovered its lien directly from 
the proceeds paid to the Medicaid recipient." Id. at f 41. Houghton III 
concluded that a recipient's failure to expressly exclude the State's claim 
did not impact the State's obligation to pay attorney fees: 
We accordingly hold that the State's obligation to pay its 
share of attorney fees is not dependent upon whether the recipient 
expressly excluded the State's claim but, rather, 
is dependent upon whether the recipient requested consent 
and whether the State's recovery was attributable to the 
efforts of the recipient's attorney. 
Id. at f 48. 
Plaintiffs incorrectly focus on a few isolated and unexplained 
instances within the Houghton III opinion referring to a "proportionate" 
share of attorney fees and argue those references require the State to 
pay fees of 33% in every case. The Houghton HI court gives no 
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explanation for its use of the word "proportionate" and simply refers 
back to paragraph 18 of its McCoy opinion, for example: 
In McCoy, we concluded that the State was obligated to 
pay a proportionate amount of the plaintiffs attorney fees because 
the plaintiff complied with section 26-19-17 of the Medicaid lien 
statute. Id. f 18. 
Houghton III, 2005 UT 63 at f 39; see also f 49. But paragraph 18 of 
the McCoy opinion does not mention a "proportionate" share of attorney 
fees. In fact, nowhere within the entire McCoy opinion is 
"proportionate" used to describe attorney fees. Like the governing 
statute, McCoy uses "proportionate" only in association with costs. 
McCoy, 2000 UT 39 at f 19. Given that , and the specific citation to the 
earlier McCoy case, it appears that the use of "proportionate" in the 
Houghton III opinion was an oversight. And, more importantly, nothing 
in Houghton III indicates the Court intended to overrule McCoy's 
holding that the State must pay a "reasonable" attorney fee.15 
Thus, the calculation of the proper amount of attorney fees to be 
paid by the State cannot be determined by a simple mathematical 
formula. The trial court recognized tha t "this is a case where 
15
 In any event, "proportionate" attorney fees are not provided by 
in the statute, which must govern. 
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calculating damages would involve numerous individual mini-trials that 
would defeat the desired efficiency of having a class-action case." R. 
4239 {Decertification Order, p. 46). The trial court's Decertification 
Order was not the first time the Plaintiffs' flat 33% fee argument was 
rejected, nor was it the first recognition that each individual case would 
require a fact-specific examination of the proper attorney fee amount. 
In 2003, Judge Nehring noted that the calculation of fees is "a fact 
intensive enterprise" and "that may create problems for a class. If it 
does, so be it." R. 1798 {Transcript 04/28/2003 Hearing pp. 86-87). 
Although there may be common questions of law or fact among the 
Plaintiffs, those common questions do not "predominate over any 
questions affecting only individual members." Utah R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3). 
Each potential claim will need to be determined on its own unique facts. 
Cases in which individualized, fact-intensive determinations 
predominate over common questions of law or fact are ill-suited for class 
action status. 
Federal courts examining class actions under identical language of 
federal rule 23 have come to similar conclusions. This Court recognizes 
the persuasiveness of federal authorities that are interpreting identical 
rules of civil procedure, and the Court will "freely refer to authorities 
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which have interpreted the federal rule." Gold Standard, Inc. v. 
American Barrick Res. Corp., 805 P.2d 164, 168 (Utah 1990); Plumb v. 
State, 809 P.2d 734, 738 (Utah 1990) (construing Rule 23(e)); Tucker v. 
State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 2002 UT 54, f 7 n.2, 53 P.3d 947. 
For example, in O'Sullivan v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., 319 
F.3d 732 (5th Cir. 2003), where plaintiffs alleged violations of the Real 
Estate Settlement Procedures Act, the Fifth Circuit reversed the class 
certification because it found the class would degenerate into a series of 
individual trials to prove damages on the claims. Focusing on the 
predominance requirement, the circuit court said tha t the potential for 
multiple suits made class certification inappropriate: 
The extent (but not the nature) of Countrywide's 
participation in the transactions varies, making 
individualized calculations of damages predominate. 
Where the plaintiffs' damage claims "focus almost 
entirely on facts and issues specific to individuals ra ther 
than the class as a whole" . . . , the potential exists that the 
class action may "degenerate in practice into multiple 
lawsuits separately t r i e d / ' . . . In such cases, class 
certification is inappropriate. 
Id. at 744-45 (internal citations omitted). 
Similarly, in Piggly Wiggly Clarksville, Inc. v. Interstate Brands 
Corp., 215 F.R.D. 523 (E.D. Texas 2003), plaintiffs sought class 
certification in a case involving alleged price fixing for bread products. 
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Although the court found tha t the Rule 23(a) requirements were met, it 
denied class certification because the Rule 23(b) predominance 
requirement was not met. The court found that predominance was 
destroyed by the necessarily individual damage calculations: 
Predominance and manageability may be destroyed 
solely by the complexity of determining damages when 
that determination does not lend itself to a 
mathematical calculation that can be applied to all the 
class members . . . . The lack of a generalized formula 
would result in countless mini-trials on the issue of 
damages if liability is first established. 
Id. at 531 (internal citations omitted). 
Next, in Clopton v. Budget Rent-a-Car Corp., 197 F.R.D. 502 (N.D. 
Ala. 2000), the plaintiffs wanted to certify a class in a case alleging a 
rental car company improperly charged customers for gasoline they did 
not use. The trial court denied class certification because individual 
calculations of damages would predominate over other issues common to 
the class. The court concluded that each case would turn on individual 
facts that determined the proper damage calculation and destroyed 
predominance and precluded class action status: 
Indeed, it appears that Clopton's individual contract-
based claims will likely boil down to a factual dispute 
about how full the tank of his vehicle was when he 
returned it and whether a particular Adamson 
employee used an erroneous assumption as to the size 
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of the tank to calculate the refueling charge. Such 
evidence of individualized conduct on the part of 
employees of Budget and its licensees indicates that 
the Court would have to conduct thousands of fact-
intensive mini-trials to determine breach and 
damages with respect to each member's contract-
based claims. 
Id. at 509 (footnote omitted). 
Likewise, in Windham v. American Brands, Inc., 565 F.2d 59, 68 
(4th Cir. 1977), tobacco growers wanted to bring a class action antitrust 
suit. The trial court declined to allow a class action, and the Fourth 
Circuit agreed. The circuit court noted that when a calculation of 
damages would require separate mini-trials, the damage aspects of the 
case predominate and "render the class action unmanageable as a class 
action." Id. 
Finally, this Court's reasoning in Call v. City of West Jordan, 727 
P.2d 180 (Utah 1986), is particularly relevant. In Call, this Court 
upheld denial of class certification in a case where the amount of each 
potential class members' claims would have to be determined on an 
individual basis. Noting the importance of judicial economy in class 
actions, the Call court stated: 
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Judicial economy would be little served because the 
amount of the claim of each class member would still 
need to be determined on an individual basis, 
regardless of class action status. 
Id. at 183-184. 
Here, the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it concluded 
that because the determination of attorney fees is an individual and 
fact-intensive inquiry, the class should be decertified. Individual 
inquiries defeat Rule 23's purposes and goals to achieve economies of 
time, effort, and expense and to promote uniformity of decisions in cases 
with similarly situated plaintiffs. Plaintiffs cannot satisfy Rule 
23(b)(3),s predominance requirement, and the class was properly 
decertified. This Court should affirm the Decertification Order. 
Furthermore, after the trial court ordered the State to give 
Plaintiffs full access to all of the third-party liability cases, R. 2165, 
Plaintiffs reached the inescapable conclusion that attorney fees have 
already been paid in the vast majority of cases. Plaintiffs concede that 
the State "gave 'consent' to representation in the overwhelming number 
of cases." R. 3470. Plaintiffs also acknowledged they were wrong in 
their belief that "denials would be predominant," in fact, Plaintiffs 
learned that "consent was virtually universal." R. 3484. 
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Thus, faced with the inevitable realization that the number of 
claims and the amount of money involved is significantly less than 
Plaintiffs originally claimed, Plaintiffs now claim tha t not only are they 
entitled to attorney fees where none were paid, they are also entitled to 
more attorney fees in the cases where the State and the recipient's 
attorney agreed to a fee amount and that amount was paid or the lien 
discounted. Plaintiffs lack any support for this novel theory. 
The trial court ruled that , in cases where the State and the 
recipient's attorney agreed to the amount of fees, the Court would not 
change the terms of those agreements. R. 4241. In addition, the trial 
court recognized more serious problems with certifying a class of 
Plaintiffs where the State consented and paid an attorney fee or 
discounted its lien. "In every case where the State paid an attorney fee 
or discounted its lien, there will be issues involving estoppel, waiver, or 
accord. By accepting the State's attorney fee or discount, a question 
necessarily arises whether the recipient waived or is estopped from 
asserting a right to additional attorney fees." R. 4242 {Decertification 
Order, p. 49). Estoppel, waiver, and accord are all fact-intensive 
inquiries and will require examination of each individual case. See, e.g., 
State v. Irizarry, 945 P.2d 676, 678 (Utah 1997) (noting "variety of fact-
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intensive circumstances" where estoppel can apply); IHC Health Servs., 
Inc. v.D& KMgmt. Inc., 2003 UT 5, f 7, 73 P.3d 320 (waiver is 
intensely fact dependent question); Neiderhauser Builders & Dev. Corp. 
v. Campbell, 824 P.2d 1193, 1198 (Utah App. 1992) (questions of fact 
about accord and satisfaction precluded summary judgment). Thus, the 
individual questions of estoppel, waiver, and accord would predominate. 
The trial court properly decertified the class of Plaintiffs whose fees the 
State has already paid, even if the amount was less than 33%. 
The proper amount of attorney fees will require a series of mini-
trials. Individual plaintiffs will have to prove the McCoy claim 
elements. At a minimum, they will have to prove tha t they were 
represented by an attorney, that they requested consent from the State 
to pursue the State's claim, and the amount of the attorney fees that the 
State must pay. The State can then raise any defenses it may have, 
such as the recipient's lack of cooperation or that the State satisfied its 
lien through its own efforts. A few of the potential individual questions 
that will be involved in the attorney fee calculation are: 1) when the 
recipient asked for the State's consent; 2) how much investigation had 
been done on the case before the request for consent; 3) the likelihood 
the case would settle without trial; 4) whether liability or causation 
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were aggressively contested; 5) the complexity of the case; 6) whether 
the case went to trial; 7) the experience, reputation, and ability of the 
recipient's attorney; and 8) the amount of the Medicaid lien. R. 4237 
{Decertification Order, p. 44 n. 20); R. 2827-28 (Affidavit of Brent Perry, 
\ 8 ) . Under these circumstances, the common questions do not 
predominate over the questions affecting only individual class members, 
and Rule 23(b)(3) is not satisfied. Thus, the class was properly 
decertified. The trial court was well within the bounds of its discretion 
when it decertified the class, and Plaintiffs have not shown how the trial 
court exceeded those bounds. This Court should affirm the trial court. 
III. Plaintiffs' Two "Related Questions" Are Not Properly 
Before the Court. 
Plaintiffs raise two "Related Questions" tha t are not properly before 
the Court and should be ignored. Plaintiffs ask the Court to opine on the 
appropriate class criteria and ask the Court to opine on the scope of 
discovery. This Court did not grant permission for Plaintiffs to appeal 
either issue, and the Court should decline to address them. See Houghton 
III, 2005 UT 63 at \ 16; State v. Lush, 2001 UT 102, \ 32, 37 P.3d 1103 
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(refusing to address an issue that was beyond the scope of review for 
which permission for interlocutory appeal was granted). 
In .itltliii in, HiLsitln'ati'ui il llir issues is not necessary. P irst, they 
have already been address? / /• - •" / 
elements of a McCoy attorney fees claim. Nothing further is needed. 
Second, as to Plaintiffs' request that this Court order "full and 
iinn^trieh'd u. •• * : lammis access to ail wi Hie thnd-party liability 
files was not limito f ' • -1 I! i 
produce one hundred third-party liability case files. R. 4337, R. 2047-50. 
After Plaintiffs' motion, the trial court ordered the State to produce "all 
t c< irum November i , iyy 1 to present where the 
Medicaid recipient v. VIMV-., .*. - ••< . . , i ; ; \ . : 
satisfied its lien." R. 2165. In accordance with that order, Plaintiffs had 
full access to all 2,785 third-party liability case files. During a three and 
10, 2006, Plaintiffs' 
inspection team, which ronsisl^il nl i |i In fivi» pc**i|»l<*, wa* IVev In inspi*cl, 
copy or scan any files it wanted. Plaintiffs chose what files to copy and 
chose to copy only 412 of them. Plaintiffs' access was limited by no one 
b ..'MiMMvc. .-..,.. „^.. .. , vu. that Uh! tiiiu court would not ai w 
Plaintiffs i • an aid »!. n-i* «»i HMT . • <•? .ivs.-, me 
information Plaintiffs need to determine potential recipients who may 
have a McCoy claim is available without contacting those people. See R. 
2830-3356 (copies of electronic case files produced in discovery). And 
Plaintiffs have not shown otherwise. Nor have Plaintiffs argued in the 
'petition for interlocutory appeal or in their brief, how the trial court's 
discovery orders were an abuse of discretion.16 "A trial court is allowed 
broad discretion in granting or denying discovery; 'its determinations on 
this subject will not be overturned on appeal unless the court has abused 
its discretion.'" State v. Willett, 909 P.2d 219, 222 (Utah 1995) (quoting 
State u. Knill, 656 P.2d 1026, 1027 (Utah 1982)). In light of the trial 
court's order requiring the State to provide full access to all of the third-
party liability files and the fact that Plaintiffs have not shown that the 
information Plaintiffs seek was unavailable to them, the trial court's 
discovery rulings were not an abuse of discretion. 
Plaintiffs' "Related Questions" are nothing more than an attempt to 
have this Court rule on issues that are not before it, have already been 
addressed, or are better left to the discretion of the trial court at this time. 
16
 Plaintiffs have now waived that claim. Brown v. Glover, 2000 
UT 89, f 23, 16 P.3d 540 (failure to raise issue in opening brief waives 
it); State v. Lee, 2006 UT 5, \ 23, 128 P.3d 1179 (court will not address 
inadequately briefed issues). 
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Plaintiffs can always preserve the issues below and raise them, if 
necessary, aiu L Jie case concludes. 
CONCLUSION 
T h i s ( i' s— \ ' < •(] ' • ' . ( • / / / / i , , w / t / / ; ( / ' / C i r 
because Plaintiffs' petition for interlocutory revi *• •-w wn s 1 • • 1 11111, 11 111 
Court concludes that the petition was timely filed, the Court should hold 
that the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it decertified the 
class, I'l'i lie • 23(b)(3Xs i € q;i lirement that th 3 • z :xi w .: t-su > ... ;<^i and law 
predominate over issues that affect only individii '!.«— - >\ >%>.• 
satisfied. The trial court properly decertified the class. This Court should 
affirm the trial court. 
}4i 
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the date of entry of such order, did not apply 1292, J 4 2 Utah Ads RIJJ i 200S Ul App S<>8 
retroactively to husband's appeal from the trial Divorce @» 181 
court's entry of divorce decree and thus hus-
 A l t h o u g h d e f a u l t judgment entered in d.vo^c 
band s notice of appeal filed before entry of
 a c t i o n ^ ^ final ^ t h r e e m o n t h s 
order amending the divorce judgment was a
 c , . , A , . r 
nullity, pursuant to previous version, of rule; after its entry, such judgment started running of 
Supreme Court's order adopting amendment es- three-month period within which to file motion 
tabhshed an effective date for the amendment, to set aside decree or one-month period within 
and husband's time to file appeal from the which to take appeal. Rules of Civil Procedure, 
amended divorce judgment expired before such rules 60(b), 73. Kessimakis v Kessimakis, 
effective date Dent v. Dent, 200S 1?7 V'\& 1976 546 P 2d 888. Divorce e=> 161 
R U L E 5. DISCRETIONARY APPEALS HtOM INTERLOCK I OKI OH11 
DFRS 
(a) Petition for permission to appeal. An appeal from an interlocutory order 
may be sought by any party by filing a petition for permission to appeal from 
the interlocutory order with the clerk of the appellate court with jurisdiction 
over the case within 20 days after the entry of the order of the trial court, with 
proof of service on all other parties to the action, A timely appeal from an 
order certified under Rule 54(b), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, that the 
appellate court determines is not final may, in the discretion of the appellate 
court, be considered by the appellate court as a petition for permission to 
appeal an interlocutory order. The appellate court may direct the appellant to 
file a petition that conforms to the requirements of paragraph (c) of this rule. 
(b) Fees and copies of petition. For a petition presented to the Supreme 
Court, the petitioner shall file with the Clerk of the Supreme Court an original 
and five copies of the petition, together with the fee required by statute. For a 
petition presented to the Court of Appeals, the petitioner shall file with the 
Clerk of the
 eCourt of Appeals an original and four copies of the petition, 
together with the fee required by statute. The petitioner shall serve the petition 
on the opposing party and notice of the filing of the petition on the trial court. 
If an order is issued authorizing the appeal, the clerk of the appellate court 
shall immediately give notice of the order by mail to the respective parties and 
shall transmit a certified copy of the order, together with a copy of the petition, 
to the trial court where the petition and order shall be filed in lieu of a notice of 
appeal. 
(c) Content of petition. 
(c)(1) The petition shall contain: 
(c)(1)(A) A concise statement of facts material to a consideration ol ihe issue 
presented and the order sought to be reviewed; 
(c)(1)(B) The issue presented expressed in the terms and circumstances of th< 
case but without unnecessary detail, and a demonstration that the issue wa 
preserved in the trial court. Petitioner must state the applicable standard o 
appellate review and cite supporting authority; 
(c)(1)(C) A statement of the reasons why an immediate interlocutory appe i 
should be permitted, including a concise analysis of the statutes, i ules or case 
believed to be determinative of the issue stated; and 
443 
le 5 RULES OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE APPEALS FROM TRIAL CCU 
)(1)(D) A statement of the reason why the appeal may materially advance 
termination of the litigation. 
)(2) If the appeal is subject to assignment by the Supreme Court to the 
Lit of Appeals, the phrase "Subject to assignment to the Court' of Appeals" 
11 appear immediately under the title of the document, i.e. Petition for 
mission to Appeal. Appellant may then set forth in the petition a concise 
ement why the Supreme Court should decide the case in light of the 
vant factors listed in Rule 9(c)(9). 
)(3) The petitioner shall attach a copy of the order of the trial court from 
ch an appeal is sought and any related findings of fact and conclusions of 
and opinion. 
1) Answer. Within 10 days after service of the petition, any other party may 
an answer in opposition or concurrence. If the appeal is subject to 
gnment by the Supreme Court to^the Court o£ Appeals, the answer may 
tain a concise response to the petitioner's contentions under Rule 5(c). An 
;inal and five copies of the answer shall be filed in the Supreme Court. An 
;inal and four copies shall be filed in the Court of Appeals. The respondent 
[1 serve the answer on the petitioner. The petition and any answer shall be 
tnitted without oral argument unless otherwise ordered. 
0 Grant of permission. An appeal from an interlocutory order may be 
nted only if it appears that the order involves substantial rights and may 
erially affect the final decision or that a determination of the correctness of 
order before final judgment will better serve the administration and 
rests of justice. The order permitting the appeal may set forth the particu-
issue or point of law which will be considered and may be on such terms, 
uding the filing of a bond for costs and damages, as the appellate court may 
Tmine. The clerk of the appellate court shall immediately give the parties 
trial court notice by mail of any order granting or denying the petition. If 
petition is granted, the appeal shall be deemed to have been filed and 
keted by the granting of the petition. All proceedings subsequejit to the 
iting of the petition shall be as, and within the time required, for appeals 
n final judgments except that no docketing statement shall be filed under 
e 9 unless the court otherwise orders. 
) Stays pending interlocutory review. The appellate court will not consider 
ipphcation for a stay pending disposition of an interlocutory appeal until the 
tioner has filed a petition for interlocutory appeal. 
e n d e d effective O c t o b e r 1, 1992; Ju ly 1, 1994; Apri l 1, 1996, N o v e m b e r 1, 1999; 
1 1, 2 0 0 4 , N o v e m b e r 1, 2 0 0 6 ] 
Cross References 
locutory appeal, petition, see Rules App Proc , Form 2 
Library References 
peal and Error <3»361, 366 
lminal Law <£=> 1071, 1072 
Westlaw Key Number Searches 
30k366, 110kl071, 110kl072 
30k361; 
C J , S Appeal and Error § § 8 6 , 1' 
- 3 1 2 , 3 1 6 , 3 1 8 
C J . S Criminal Law § 1685. 
Unil 
Interlocutory appeal, 
Civil rights actions in state coi 
of qualified immunity, right, 
In general 1 
Adoption proceedings 12 
pail and bail forfeiture 10 
Bindover orders 11 
Child custody proceedings 20 
Cpllateral orders \1 
jDependency and neglect proceeding 
Discovery rulings- 16 
Discretion of court 4 
Habeas corpus 13 
Insurance receivership and hquiaatj 
Motions to dismiss 8 
Necessity of petition 5 
Notice of appeal 5.5 " ,
 j, 
Partial summary judgment 19 
Pleas and plea agreements 9 
Post trial motions 21 
Purpose of rule 2 
Removal orders 18 A 
Rulings affecting substantial rignfcT 
Separate claims 6 
Trial court 3 
1. In general 
Orders and judgments that are 
be appealed if such appeals are si 
missible, if the appellate court g* 
sion, or if the trial court expressly 
as final for purposes of appeal 
P r o c , Rule 5, Rules Civ Proc. 
Bradbury v Valencia, 2000, 5 I 
Utah 'Adv Rep 7, 2000 UT 50 
Error <S=» 68, Appeal And Error <S= 
As exceptions to the "final judf 
party may appeal an mterlocuU* 
governing statute so provides; it 
properly certifies the order undei 
erning certification for appeal or 
Appeals grants permission for ai 
appeal under rule governing app* 
locutory orders Rules Civ.Pro< 
Rules App Proc , Rule 5 Matter^ 
Paby K , 1998, 967 P.2d 9 4 7 , ^ 
Rep 37. Appeal And Error &* 3« 
Appeal of right taken from ui 
der will be treated as permissrv 
appeal only in extraordinary cas 
£ r o c , Rule 5 Town of Manil 
Land C o , 1991, 818 P-2d 2 Ap 
@=>358 # 
PARTIES Rttle 23 
In action against bank for savings payable to 
, tjand or wife or survivor wherein wife's ex-
ltnx claimed wife's share, deceased wife's 
lece's testimony regarding conversation be-
tween husband and wife wherem wife told hus-
band wife would leave large part of her money 
niece held not inadmissible as irrelevant and 
mmatenal Obradovich v Walker Bros Bank-
ers, 1932, 80 Utah 587, 16 P 2d 212 Inter-
pleader <®=* 29 , ^ 
a _ Relief awarded, proceedings and relief 
Injunctive relief in an interpleader action is 
especially-proper where there are n u m e r o u s 
claimants and where such relief would present 
a multiplicity of lawsuits 28 U S C A § 1335 
US v Major Oil Corp , 1978, 583 F 2d 1152 
Interpleader ®=> 32 
An injunctive power of a court hearing in 
interpleader action is nationwide and is intend-
ed to hold any proceeding the court deems 
inconsistent with the interpleader proceeding 
28 U S C A § 2361 U S v Major Oil Corp 
1978, 583 ¥2d 1152 Interpleader <&=> 32 
10. Judgment or decree, proceedings and 
relief - > r 
Where trial court in interpleader action made 
no adjudication on claims as between former 
partners in used car business to Juno's with-
drawn from partnership checking account an4 ? 
proceeds of sale of car by second! partner, but 
rather, merely recognized that controversy con-
cerning such !money was pending for resolution 
in first partner's, suit for assets and an account-
ing, and orderecf that fund be held in partner-
ship account inf bank urltil such suit was re-
solved, judgment in interpleader action had no 
res judicata effect upon such stutfr Rules of 
Civil Procedure, Rule 22 Terry's Stales, trie v. 
Vander Veur,*1980, 618 P 2 d 29 'Judgment•$=> 
650 „ ^ 
Where a litigant tenders the money claimed 
by^two other parties into court, no judgment in * 
his favor for the money can legally be entere^£ 
McGuire v State Bank of Tremonton, 1917, 49 
Utah 381, 164 P 494. interpleader <S» 33 i ^ , , i 
11. Costs and fees, proceedings and re-
lief 
Attorney's fees incurred by trustee and benefi-
ciaries in trustee s interpleader action were of a 
class historically beyond sCope of taxable costs 
and their award necessarily postulated a per 
mitting statute or an equitable discretion in trial 
court Fed Rules Civ Proc rule 54(d) 28 
U S C A , U C A 1953, 22-3 12(2) Bnsacher v 
Tracy-Collins Trust Company, 1960, 277 F 2d 
519 Interpleader <§=» 35 
In interpleader action wherein bank which 
held escrow documents sought determination 
pf rights of purchaser and vendors under install 
ment real estate contract, awarding bank attor-
ney fee of $1,500 was proper, in view of fact 
that a rule authorized bank to file the inter 
pleader action and that escrow agreement gave 
bank option to await judicial determination be-
fore continuing its duties under the agreement 
and granted bank a hen for all actual and neces-
sary expenses and liabilities incurred Rules 
Civ Proc , Rule 22 First Sec Bank of Utah, 
N A v Maxwell, 1983, 659 P 2d 1078 Inter-
pleader <3=> 35 
In interpleader action wherein bank, which 
held escrow documents, sought determination 
of rights of purchaser and vendors under install-
ment real estate contract, award of $1,500 in 
attorney fees to bank was to be paid by vendors, 
in view of fact that they breached their cove-
nants under escrow agreement by instructing 
bank not to accept further payments from pu£n 
chaser when the instructions read clearly to the 
contrary, and purchaser, who was delinquent 
until certain date, was to bear whatever attor-
ney fees were found to be reasonably owing the 
* vendors for enforcing contract until that date 
, First Sec Bank of Utah, JJ A v Maxwell, 1983, 
659 P 2d 1078 Interpleader <£=> 35 
Award of costs and attorney fees to party who 
properly brings an interpleader action is within 
equitable discretion of trial court Capson v 
Bnsbois, 1979, 592 P 2d 583 Interpleader <&=> 
35 
Where it appears that party bringing mter-
I pleader action has, through his own fault, 
caused the conflicting claims necessitating in-
terpleader, it is proper to deny party s motion 
for attorney fees Capson v Bnsbois, 1979, 592 
f 2d 583 Interpleader <®==> 35 
Where purchasers, who entered into agree-
ment with vendors to buy parcel of land which 
"deal subsequently fell through and who were 
required to make $1,000 earnest money depdsit 
with realty company, failed to appear at trial, 
trial court did not abuse its discretion in deny-
ing realty company which brought interpleader 
action, its costs and attorney fees Capson v 
Bnsbois 1979 592 P 2d 583 Interpleader <£=» 
35 
TfTTT E 23, CLASS ACTIONS 
(a) Prerequisites to a Class Action. One or more members of a class may 
sue or be sued as representative parties on behalf of all only if (1) the class is so 
numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable, (2) there are questions 
?IS 
Rule 23 RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 
6f law or fact common to the class, (3) the claims or defenses of the representa-
tive parties are typical of the claims or defenses of the class, and (4) the 
representative parties will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the 
class. 
(b) Class Actions Maintainable. An action may be maintained as a class 
action if the prerequisites of Subdivision (a) are satisfied, and in addition: 
(1) The prosecution of separate actions by or against individual members of 
the class would create a risk of: 
(A) inconsistent or varying adjudications with respect to individual mem-
bers of the class which would establish incompatible standards of Conduct for* 
the party opposing the class, or 
(B) adjudications with respect to individual members of the class which 
* would as a practical matter be dispositive 'of the interests' ctf the other 
^^embers not parties to the adjudications or substantially impair or impede 
^t&eir .ability to protect their interests; or 
tCp9\Tfre party opposing the class has acted or refused to act on grounds 
generally applicable to the class, thereby making appropriate final injunctive 
rfeliefpr corresponding declaratory relief with respect to the class as a whole; 
'V 
or 
(5) The courjt finds that* the questions of law or fact common to the members 
of the class predominate over any questions affecting only individual inembers, 
and that a class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and 
efficient adjudication of the controversy. The matters pertinent to the findings 
include: (A) the interest of members of the class in individually controlling the 
prosecution or defense of separate actions; (B) the extent and nature of any, 
litigation concerning the controversy already commenced by or against mem^ 
bers of the class; (C) the desirability or undesirability of concentrating the* 
litigation of the .claims in the particular forum; (D) the difficulties likely to be 
encountered in the management of a class action. 
(c) Determination by Order Whether Class Action to Be Maintained; Notice; 
Judgment; Actions Conducted Partially as Class Actions. 
(1) As soon as practicable after the commencement of an action brought as a 
class action, the court shall determine by order whether it is to be maintained^ 
An order under this subdivision may be conditional, and may be altered or, 
amended before the decision on the merits. M 
(2) In any class action maintained under Subdivision (b)(3), the court shall; 
direct to the members of the class the best notice practicable under th|| 
circumstances, including individual notice to all members who can be identi^ 
fied through reasonable effort. The notice shall advise each member that (A|; 
the court will exclude him from the class if he so requests by a specified date>J 
(B) the judgment, whether favorable or not, will include all members who dcg 
not request exclusion; and (C) any member who does not request exclusioffl 
may, if he desires, enter an appearance through his counsel. 
216 
PARTIES Rule 2: 
(3) The judgment in an action maintained as a< class action under Subdivisioi 
(b)(1) or (b)(2), whether, Qr not favorable to the class, shall include and describ 
those whom the court finds to be members of the class. The judgment in a] 
action maintained as a class action under Subdivision (b)(3), whether or nc 
favorable to the class, shall include and specify or describe those to whom th 
notice provided in Subdivision (c)(2) was directed, and who have not requeste 
exclusion, and whom the court finds to be members of the class. 
(4) When appropriate (A) an action may be brought or maintained as a cla* 
action with respect to particular issues, or (B) a class may be divided inl 
subclasses and each subclass treated as a class, and the provisions of this ru 
shall then be construed and applied accordingly. 
(d) Orders in Conduct of Actions. In the conduct of actions to which th 
rule applies, the court may rnake appropriate orders: (1) determining tl 
course of proceedings or prescribing measures to prevent undue repetition < 
complication in the presentation of evidence or argument; (2) requiring, for tl 
protection of the members of the class or otherwise for the fair conduct of tl 
action, that notice be given in such manner as the court may direct to some < 
all of the members of any step in the action, or of the proposed extent of t] 
judgment, or of the opportunity of members to signify whether
 Tthey consid 
the representation fair and adequate, to intervene and present claims 1 
defenses, or otherwise to come into the action; (3) imposing conditions on t 
representative parties or on intervenors; (,4) requiring that the pleadings 
amended to eliminate therefrom allegations as to representation of abse 
persons, and that the action proceed accordingly; (5) dealing with simil 
procedural matters. The orders may be combined with an order under Ri 
16, and may be altered or amended as may be desirable from time to tin 
(e) Dismissal or Compromise. A class action shall not be dismissed 
compromised without the approval of the court, and notice, of the^pr0pos 
dismissal or , compromise shall be given to all members of the class' in^'Su 
manner a s the court directs. 
Cross References 
Thrifts settlement financing, see § 7-21-1 et seq 
Law Review and Journal Commentaries 
Brandt, Fairness to the Absent Members of a lar Issues Under Rule 23(c)(4)(A), 2002 Utal 
Defendant Class A Proposed Revision of Rule Rev 249 (2002) 
23, 1990 BYU L Rev 909(1990) 
Romberg, Half a Loaf is Predominant and 
Superior to None Class Certification of Particu-
Library References 
Compromise and Settlement <S=*53 to 71 287k35 61 to 287k35 89, 89k53 to 89 
Declaratory Judgment <S=>305 118Ak305 
Parties <S=*35 1 to 35 21, 35 31 to 35 51, 35 61
 C J S Compromise and Settlement §§ 2 
to 35 89 27 
Westlaw Key Number Searches 287k35 l t o ~
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BENEFITS RECOVERY ACT §26-19-7 
Note 3 
n)(a) If ^ e r e c i p i e n t proceeds without the department's written consent as 
ired by Subsection (l)(a), the department is not bound by any decision, 
wl ment, agreement, or compromise rendered or made on the claim or in the 
action. 
(b) The department may recover in full from the recipient or any party to 
which the proceeds were made payable all medical assistance which it has 
orovided and retains its right to commence an independent action against the 
third party, subject to Subsection 26-19-5(3). 
(3) The department's written consent, if given, shall state under what terms 
the interests of the department may be represented in an action commenced by 
the recipient. 
(4) The department may not pay more than 33% of its total recovery for 
attorney's fees, but shall pay a proportionate share of the costs in an action that 
is commenced with the department 's written consent. 
Uws 1984, c. 34, § 5; Laws 1989, c. 163, § 2; Laws 1995, c. 102, § 3, eff. May 1, 1995. 
Cross References 
Costs awarded upon judgment, see Rules Civ. Proa , Rule 54. 
Intervention, see Rules Civ. P roa , Rule 24. 
Notes of Decisions 
In general 1 
Construction with federal law 2 
Costs and attorney fees 5 
Proceeds payable by third party 4 
Recovery without consent of state 3 
1. In general 
Under Medical Benefits Recovery Act, State 
may (1) take action directly against the third 
party for reimbursement of medical assistance 
benefits, for which the State pays its own ex-
penses; (2) grant consent to recipients of medi-
cal assistance seeking to pursue the State's 
claim, whereby the State's recovery will be re-
duced by reasonable attorney fees and, if any, 
its proportionate share of the costs of an action; 
or (3) refuse consent and proceed against the 
recipient after the recipient recovers from the 
third party, in which case the State's recovery 
shall be reduced by reasonable attorney fees. 
U.CA1953, 26-19-7(l)(a), (4). State ex rel. 
Office of Recovery Services v. McCoy, 2000, 999 
P2d 572, 393 Utah Adv. Rep. 17, 2000 UT 39 
Hea l ths 496(1) 
Under Medical Benefits Recovery Act, when 
the State elects to recover directly from a medi-
cal assistance recipient who has expressly ex-
cluded the State's claim from any attempt to 
recover from a third party, the State must pay 
the attorney fees incurred in procuring the 
State's share of the settlement proceeds. U.C.A 
1953, 26-19-7(l)(a), (4) State ex rel. Office of 
Recovery Services v. McCoy, 2000, 999 P.2d 
572, 393 Utah Adv. Rep. 17, 2000 UT 39. 
Health <3=* 497 
1989 amendment to Medical Benefits Recov-
ery Act, which previously prohibited filing of 
claim without State consent and, as amended, 
included settlement, compromise, release, or 
waiver of claim as well, was not substantive, 
and thus, could be applied retroactively. U.C.A. 
1953, 26-19-7(l)(a). Matter of Estate of Hig-
ley, 1991, 810 P.2d 436. Health <3=> 456 
2. Construction with federal law 
Federal statute stating that no lien may be 
imposed against individual prior to death on 
account of having received state medical assis-
tance did not apply to third-party insurance 
settlement payments received by state Medicaid 
recipient, as third-party payments did not legal-
ly become property of Medicaid recipient until 
after valid settlement, which necessarily includ-
ed reimbursement to state for Medicaid bene-
fits. Social Security Act, § 1917(a), as amend-
ed, 42 U S.C.A § 1396p(a), U C A 1953, 
26-19-5, 26-19-7(l)(a), (2). S S v State, 1998, 
972 P.2d 439, 357 Utah Adv. Rep. 15 Health 
<3»497 
3. Recovery without consent of state 
State was entitled to recover from recipients 
medical assistance payments advanced m his 
behalf, as recipient settled his claim with insur-
er without state's consent U C A. 1953, 
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recover from a third party, the State must pay Recovery Services v. McCoy, 2000, 999 P.2d 
the attorney fees incurred in procuring the 572, 393 Utah Adv. Rep. 17, 2000 UT 39. 
State's share of the settlement proceeds. U.C.A. Health <3=} 497 
1953, 26M9-7(l)(a), (4). State ex rel. Office of 
§ 26—19—6. Action by department—Notice to recipient 
(l)(a) Within 30 days after commencing an action under Subsection 
26-19-5(3), the department shall give the recipient, his guardian, personal 
representative, trustee, estate, or survivor, whichever is appropriate, written 
notice of the action by: 
(i) personal service or certified mail to the last known address of the 
person receiving the notice; or 
(ii) if no last-known address is available, by publishing a notice once a 
week for three successive weeks in a newspaper of general circulation in 
the county where the recipient resides. 
(b) Proof of service shall be filed in the action. 
(c) The recipient may intervene in the department's action at any time 
before trial. 
(2) The notice required by Subsection (1) shall name the court in which the 
action is commenced and advise the recipient of: 
(a) the right to intervene in the proceeding; 
(b) the right to obtain a private attorney; and 
(c) the department 's right to recover medical assistance directly from the 
third party. 
Laws 1981, c. 126, § 18; Laws 1984, c. 34, § 4; Laws 1985, c. 21, § 10; Laws 2004, 
72, § 3, eff. May 3, 2004. 
Cross References 
Intervention, see Rules Civ. P roc , Rule 24. 
Library References 
Health <3=>502. 
Westlaw Key Number Search: 198Hk502. 
§ 26—19-7 . Action or claim by recipient—Consent of department re-
quired—Department's right to intervene—Department's interests protect-
ed—Attorney's fees and costs 
(l)(a) A recipient may not file a claim, commence an action, or settle, 
compromise, release, or waive a claim against a third party for recovery of 
medical costs for an injury, disease, or disability for which the department has 
provided or has become obligated to provide medical assistance, without the 
department 's written consent. 
(b) The department has an unconditional right to intervene in an action 
commenced by a recipient for recovery of medical costs connected with the 
same injury, disease, or disability, for which it has provided or has become-
obligated to provide medical assistance. 
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State ex rel. Office of Recovery Services v. McCoy 
Utah,2000. 
Supreme Court of Utah. 
STATE of Utah, By and Through the OFFICE OF 
RECOVERY SERVICES, Plaintiff and Appellee, 
v. 
John L. McCOY, Defendant and Appellant. 
No. 970340. 
April 14, 2000. 
State brought suit under Medical Benefits Recovery 
Act to recover medical assistance provided recipient 
from attorney who had settled recipient's personal 
injury suit. The Third District Court, Salt Lake, 
Dennis M. Fuchs, J., entered summary judgment in 
favor of State requiring attorney to reimburse State 
for medical assistance. Attorney appealed. The 
Supreme Court, Russon, Associate C.J., held that: 
(1) federal anti-lien statute did not preclude State's 
recovery; (2) State was entitled to recover medical 
assistance payments from settlement, even though 
State had denied attorney permission to pursue 
medical assistance claim on its behalf and attorney 
had specifically excluded State's claim from his 
settlement negotiations with third party on behalf of 
recipient; and (3) State's recovery should have been 
reduced by attorney's reasonable attorney fees for 
procuring state's share of proceeds. 
Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded. 
Durham, J., filed concurring opinion. 
Wilkins, J., filed opinion concurring in part and 
dissenting in part, in which Howe, C.J., joined. 
West Headnotes 
[1] Appeal and Error 30 €^>842(2) 
30 Appeal and Error 
30XVI Review 
30XVI(A) Scope, Standards, and Extent, in 
General 
30k838 Questions Considered 
30k842 Review Dependent on Whether 
Questions Are of Law or of Fact 
30k842(2) k. Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law. Most Cited Cases 
Appeal and Error 30 €==>863 
30 Appeal and Error 
30XVI Review 
30XVI(A) Scope, Standards, and Extent, in 
General 
30k862 Extent of Review Dependent on 
Nature of Decision Appealed from 
30k863 k. In General. Most Cited Cases 
Trial court's grant or denial of summary judgment is 
reviewed for correctness and accord no deference to 
the trial court's legal conclusions. Rules Civ.Proc, 
Rule 56. 
[2] Statutes 361 €=^181(1) 
361 Statutes 
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361VI(A) General Rules of Construction 
361kl80 Intention of Legislature 
361kl81 In General 
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Statutes 361 €==>188 
361 Statutes 
361VI Construction and Operation 
361VI(A) General Rules of Construction 
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When interpreting a legislative enactment, court's 
primary role is to give effect to the legislature's 
intent as set forth in the statute's plain language. 
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States 360 €==>18.79 
360 States 
3601 Political Status and Relations 
3601(B) Federal Supremacy; Preemption 
360kl8.79 k. Social Security and Public 
Welfare. Most Cited Cases 
State's claim for reimbursement of medical 
assistance from personal injury settlement was not 
preempted by federal anti-lien statute, which 
precludes imposition of lien for medical assistance 
against property of any individual prior to his death, 
as recovery did not become recipient's property 
until State was reimbursed. Social Security Act, § 
1917(a)(1), as amended, 42 U.S.C.A. § 1396p(a)(l) 
;U.CA. 1953, 26-19-4.5. 
[4] Health 198H € ^ 4 9 7 
198H Health 
198HIII Government Assistance 
198HIII(B) Medical Assistance in General; 
Medicaid 
198Hk490 Recovery Back or Recoupment 
of Payments 
198Hk497 k. Settlements or 
Judgments, Recovery From. Most Cited Cases 
(Formerly 356Ak241) 
Under Medical Benefits Recovery Act, proceeds of 
medical assistance recipient's personal injury 
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settlement were assigned by operation of law to 
State to extent of medical assistance benefits 
provided to recipient, even though recipient 
expressly excluded the State's claim from any 
attempt to recover from third party. U.C.A.1953, 
26-19-4.5. 
[5] Health 198H €==>497 
198H Health 
198HIII Government Assistance 
198HIH(B) Medical Assistance in General; 
Medicaid 
198Hk490 Recovery Back or Recoupment 
of Payments 
198Hk497 k. Settlements or 
Judgments, Recovery From. Most Cited Cases 
(Formerly 356Ak241) 
Under Medical Benefits Recovery Act, State 
possessed lien against entire proceeds of personal 
injury settlement obtained by medical assistance 
recipient, including both amount designated medical 
payment and amount designated as bodily injury 
payment. U.C.A.1953, 26-19-4.5. 
[6] Health 198H €=>497 
198H Health 
198HIII Government Assistance 
198HIII(B) Medical Assistance in General; 
Medicaid 
198Hk490 Recovery Back or Recoupment 
of Payments 
198Hk497 k. Settlements or 
Judgments, Recovery From. Most Cited Cases 
(Formerly 356Ak241) 
Under Medical Benefits Recovery Act, State was 
entitled to recover full extent of medical assistance 
payments from personal injury settlement 
negotiated by private attorney on behalf of 
recipient, even though State had denied attorney 
permission to pursue medical assistance claim on its 
behalf, attorney had specifically excluded State's 
claim from his settlement negotiations with third 
party on behalf of recipient, and only small portion 
of settlement had been designated as being for 
medical expenses. U.C.A.1953, 26-19-4.5. 
[7] Health 198H €=^496(1) 
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198HIII(B) Medical Assistance in General; 
Medicaid 
198Hk490 Recovery Back or Recoupment 
of Payments 
198Hk496 Third Persons, Recovery 
from 
198Hk496(l) k. In General. Most 
Cited Cases 
(Formerly 356Ak241) 
Under Medical Benefits Recovery Act, recipient of 
medical assistance who has recovered for personal 
injuries against third party cannot recover portion of 
costs incurred from State, even if the recipient 
obtained consent to seek a recovery of medical 
assistance on the State's behalf, so long as recipient 
settled without "commenc[ing] an action" on State's 
behalf. U.C.A.1953, 26-19-7(4). 
[8] Health 198H €==>497 
198H Health 
198HIII Government Assistance 
198HIII(B) Medical Assistance in' General; 
Medicaid 
198Hk490 Recovery Back or Recoupment 
of Payments 
198Hk497 k. Settlements or 
Judgments, Recovery From. Most Cited Cases 
(Formerly 356Ak241) 
Under Medical Benefits Recovery Act, when the 
State elects to recover directly from a medical 
assistance recipient who has expressly excluded the 
State's claim from any attempt to recover from a 
third party, the State must pay the attorney fees 
incurred in procuring the State's share of the 
settlement proceeds. U.C.A.1953, 26-19-7(l)(a), (4) 
[9] Health 198H €^496(1) 
198H Health 
198HIII Government Assistance 
198HIII(B) Medical Assistance in General; 
Medicaid 
198Hk490 Recovery Back or Recoupment 
of Payments 
198Hk496 Third Persons, Recovery 
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from 
198Hk496(l) k. In General. Most 
Cited Cases 
(Formerly 356Ak241) 
Under Medical Benefits Recovery Act, State may 
(1) take action directly against the third party for 
reimbursement of medical assistance benefits, for 
which the State pays its own expenses; (2) grant 
consent to recipients of medical assistance seeking 
to pursue the State's claim, whereby the State's 
recovery will be reduced by reasonable attorney 
fees and, if any, its proportionate share of the costs 
of an action; or (3) refuse consent and proceed 
against the recipient after the recipient recovers 
from the third party, in which case the State's 
recovery shall be reduced by reasonable attorney 
fees. U.C.A.1953, 26-19-7(l)(a), (4). 
*573 Jan Graham, Att'y Gen., Stephanie M. 
Saperstein, Karma Dixon, Asst. Att'ys Gen., Salt 
Lake City, for plaintiff. 
John L. McCoy, pro se. 
RUSSON, Associate Chief Justice: 
% 1 Defendant John L. McCoy appeals from the 
trial court's grant of summary judgment in favor of 
the State requiring McCoy to reimburse the State 
for medical assistance received by McCoy's client, 
David Sevey. 
K 2 On July 10, 1993, David Sevey was injured 
when he slipped and fell on a sidewalk in front of a 
K-Mart store. The property was owned by G. 
Walter Gasser & Associates ("Gasser").™1 
Lacking adequate funds to pay his medical bills, 
which exceeded $16,000, Sevey requested medical 
assistance from the State of Utah. The State paid 
$8,846.92 toward Sevey's medical bills. 
FN1. The record names the property owner 
alternately as Gasser and CDI. For 
purposes of this opinion, we refer to 
Gasser as the owner. 
K 3 Thereafter, Sevey retained an attorney, John L. 
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McCoy, to seek recovery of damages from Gasser. 
Before proceeding against any potentially liable 
parties, McCoy contacted the Office of Recovery 
Services ("ORS") requesting consent to bring an 
action on the State's behalf against Gasser's insurer. 
On *574 July 19, 1994, ORS wrote a letter to 
McCoy declining McCoy's request to represent 
ORS and stating that ORS would seek full recovery 
directly from any liable third parties. Additionally, 
ORS requested that McCoy "discuss particulars of 
this case with [ORS] prior to any settlement 
negotiations." McCoy wrote a letter responding to 
ORS, explaining, "Your letter of July 19, 1994 
leaves me no other choice but not to include your 
claim for medical expenses in any action that I take. 
" On July 21, 1994, ORS sent notices to Sevey, 
McCoy, and K-Mart explaining that the State has a 
lien against any money payable to Sevey up to 
$8,846.92 
K 4 On July 20, 1995, McCoy sent a demand letter 
to Gasser's insurer, Great American Insurance 
Company ("Great American"),™2 demanding 
payment on behalf of Sevey. Specifically, McCoy 
requested to settle with Great American "for the 
sum of $35,000.00, plus medical bills of $8,000.00." 
Explaining his demand for medical costs, McCoy 
noted in his letter to Great American: 
FN2. The record names the insurer 
alternately as Great American Insurance 
Company and American National Fire 
insurance Company. For purposes of this 
opinion, we refer to the insurer as "Great 
American." 
[Sevey's] medical bills from the tibia and fibula 
fracture are $7,297.66, copies of which are 
attached. These do not include the first bills for the 
removal of the patella which amounted to roughly 
$8,000.00, which the State of Utah paid. The State 
of Utah will not allow me to pursue their claim, 
therefore, I do not make any demand for any 
medical bills that the State has paid or will pay. 
McCoy added that Sevey's total medical bills "even 
excluding the medical bills that the State has 
advanced are $8,000.00." 
© 2007 ThomsonAVest. No 
f 5 McCoy eventually settled Sevey's dispute with 
Great American, and on October 9, 1995, Great 
American issued two checks to McCoy, both listing 
McCoy and Sevey as co-payees. One check for 
$22,800 was labeled as payment for "BODILY 
INJURY"; the other check for $5,000 was labeled 
as "MEDICAL PAYMENT." Upon receipt of the 
settlement proceeds, McCoy placed $8,846.92 in 
his client trust account. On October 13, 1995, 
Sevey signed a document releasing both K-Mart 
and Gasser from "any and all claims" resulting from 
the slip-and-fall incident. 
T[ 6 Shortly thereafter, the State commenced this 
action against McCoy pursuant to the Utah Medical 
Benefits Recovery Act (the "Act"), alleging that the 
State was entitled to recover $8,846.92 from the 
settlement proceeds. The State moved for 
summary judgment on its claim, arguing that the 
Act required McCoy to reimburse the State in full. 
H 7 In response, McCoy contended first that the 
State's claim under the Act was preempted by a 
federal anti-lien statute. Second, McCoy claimed 
that the State was not entitled to reimbursement 
from the settlement proceeds because he 
specifically excluded the $8,846.92 from his 
settlement negotiations. Third, in the alternative, 
McCoy contended that if the State was entitled to 
reimbursement from the settlement proceeds, the 
State's recovery was limited to the $5,000 
designated as medical payment. Fourth, McCoy 
argued that in the event he must reimburse the State, 
he is entitled to attorney fees for procuring the 
settlement. 
H 8 The trial court granted the State's motion for 
summary judgment, ordering McCoy to pay the full 
amount of $8,846.92 to the State with no reduction 
for attorney fees. McCoy now appeals. 
[1][2] U 9 Summary judgment is proper when there 
are no issues of material fact and the moving party 
is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. SeeUtah 
R. Civ. P. 56(e); Thompson v. Jess, 1999 UT 22, U 
12, 979 P.2d 322. We review a trial court's grant 
to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works. 
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or denial of summary judgment for correctness and 
accord no deference to the trial court's legal 
conclusions. See Malibu Inv. Co. v. Sparks, 2000 
UT 30, 1f 12, 996 P.2d 1043. We also note that 
when interpreting a legislative enactment, our 
primary role is to give effect to the legislature's 
intent as set forth in the *575 statute's plain 
language. See Evans v. State, 963 P.2d 177, 184 
(Utah 1998). 
I. PREEMPTION UNDER THE FEDERAL 
ANTI-LIEN STATUTE 
[3] f 10 McCoy's first argument is that the State's 
claim for reimbursement under the Act is preempted 
by the federal anti-lien statute, which reads: 
No lien may be imposed against the property of any 
individual prior to his death on account of medical 
assistance paid... on his behalf under the State plan. 
42 U.S.C.A. § 1396p(a)(l) (Supp.1999). This 
issue was resolved by two cases decided after this 
appeal was filed, S.S. v. State, 972 P.2d 439 (Utah 
1998), and Wallace v. Estate of Jackson, 972 P.2d 
446 (Utah 1998). S.S. and Wallace held that under 
the Act, any third-party recovery does not become 
the "property" of the recipient until the recipient has 
reimbursed the State for all medical assistance the 
State provided. See S.S., 972 P.2d at 442; Wallace, 
972 P.2d at 448. As a result, the State's attempt to 
recover from the settlement proceeds does not 
amount to a lien upon the recipient's "property." 
See S.S., 972 P.2d at 442; Wallace, 972 P.2d at 448 
. Therefore, the Act does not conflict with the 
federal statute. 
II. THE STATE'S RIGHT TO REIMBURSEMENT 
\ 11 McCoy next argues that the State is not 
entitled to any reimbursement from the settlement 
proceeds because McCoy specifically excluded the 
State's claim for $8,846.92 from his settlement 
negotiations. Alternatively, McCoy contends that, 
if the State is entitled to reimbursement from the 
© 2007 Thomson/West. No 
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proceeds, the State's recovery is limited to the 
$5,000 specifically designated as medical payment. 
[4][5] [6] \ 12 Three provisions of the Act are 
determinative of McCoy's arguments. First, the 
Act provides: 
(1) (a) To the extent that medical assistance is 
actually provided to a recipient, all benefits for 
medical services or payments from a third party 
otherwise payable to or on behalf of a recipient are 
assigned by operation of law to the department if 
the department provides, or becomes obligated to 
provide, medical assistance, regardless of who 
made application for the benefits on behalf of the 
recipient. 
Utah Code Ann. § 26-19-4.5(l)(a) (1998) 
(emphasis added).1^3 Second, the Act provides in 
pertinent part: 
FN3. The "department" to which the Act 
refers is the Department of Health, which 
was created pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 
26-1-4 (Supp.1981). 
(b) The department's claim to recover medical 
assistance provided as a result of the injury ... is a 
lien against any proceeds payable to or on behalf of 
the recipient by that third party. 
Id. § 26-19-5(1 Kb) (emphasis added). Third, the 
Act states: 
(b) The department may recover in full from the 
recipient or any party to which the proceeds were 
made payable all medical assistance which it has 
provided and retains its right to commence an 
independent action against the third party.... 
Id.§ 26-19-7(2)(b) (emphasis added). Thus, under 
section 26-19-4.5, the settlement proceeds are 
assigned by operation of law to the State to the 
extent that the State has provided benefits to Sevey, 
i.e., $8,846.92. Additionally, under section 
26-19-5, the State possesses a lien against the entire 
settlement proceeds, including both the amount 
designated as medical payment and the amount 
designated as bodily injury payment. Finally, 
under section 26-19-7, the State is entitled to 
recover in full from the settlement proceeds all of 
to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works. 
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the medical assistance the State provided to Sevey. 
Therefore, under these provisions of the Act, the 
State is entitled to recover $8,846.92 from the 
settlement proceeds. 
III. MCCOY'S ENTITLEMENT TO ATTORNEY 
FEES 
K 13 Finally, McCoy argues that if the State is 
entitled to recover from the settlement*576 
proceeds, he is entitled to recover attorney fees 
from the State for procuring the settlement. The 
State contends that McCoy is not entitled to 
attorney fees under the Act because he lacked 
consent to bring an action on the State's behalf. 
Tf 14 Before determining whether the Act requires 
the State to pay attorney fees, we must examine the 
provision of the Act that requires consent to bring a 
claim on the State's behalf. This provision states: 
(1) (a) A recipient may not file a claim, commence 
an action, or settle, compromise, release, or waive a 
claim against a third party for recovery of medical 
costs for an injury, disease, or disability for which 
the department has provided or has become 
obligated to provide medical assistance, without the 
department's written consent. 
Utah Code Ann. § 26-19-7(l)(a) (1998). Thus, 
under this statute, a recipient must seek the State's 
consent before attempting to recover from a third 
party for any medical costs paid by the State. We 
explained in S. S. v. State that "[t]his provision 
protects both the liable third party and the State 
from ill-informed or devious action by the recipient. 
" 972 P.2d 439, 441 (Utah 1998). 
T[ 15 In the instant case, it is undisputed that 
McCoy lacked the State's consent to pursue the 
State's claim against Great American. McCoy 
requested, and the State denied, consent to pursue 
the State's claim. McCoy then provided notice to 
the State and the third party that he was not seeking 
to recover for those medical costs for which the 
State had provided assistance to Sevey. Rather, 
McCoy expressly excluded the State's claim for 
reimbursement from his settlement negotiations. 
Thus, in accordance with the Act, McCoy did not 
© 2007 ThomsonAVest. No 
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settle any claim for medical costs for which the 
State provided assistance. The State nonetheless 
argues that because McCoy lacked consent to bring 
an action on the State's behalf, the State-although 
demanding payment from the recipient's settlement 
proceeds-does not have to pay a share of McCoy's 
attorney fees in securing that settlement. 
[7] T| 16 We now turn to the provision of the Act 
governing awards of attorney fees and costs. This 
provision reads: 
(4) The department may not pay more than 33% of 
its total recovery for attorney's fees, but shall pay a 
proportionate share of the costs in an action that is 
commenced with the department's written consent. 
Utah Code Ann. § 26-19-7(4) (1998). Subsection 
(4) of section 26-19-7 is divided by a comma into 
two separate parts, the former dealing with attorney 
fees and the latter dealing with costs. We look first 
to the portion that addresses awards of costs. The 
plain language of this portion of subsection (4) is 
narrowed to award only the costs of "an 'action.:. 
commenced with the department's written consent." 
Id. (emphasis added). Thus, a recipient cannot 
recover "costs" where an action has not commenced 
even though the recipient has "file[d] a claim" or " 
settle[d], compromise[d], releasefd], or waive[d] a 
claim against a third party." Id. § 26-19-7(l)(a). 
This is true even if the recipient obtained consent to 
seek a recovery on the State's behalf. 
K 17 In the instant case, McCoy cannot recover 
costs from the State because no "action" was 
commenced against a third party; rather, McCoy " 
settle[d]" and "compromise[d]" with the third party, 
and Sevey "release[d]" the third party from any 
further claims by Sevey. Id. As a result, even if 
McCoy had obtained consent to bring the State's 
claim, the State would have no duty to reimburse 
him for costs, so long as he settled without " 
commenc[ing] an action" on the State's behalf. Id. 
[8] % 18 However, unlike the statute's limited 
provision for costs, the portion of subsection (4) 
that provides for attorney fees is not restricted to 
reimbursement for fees incurred in an "action"; nor 
is it limited to those cases in which the State grants 
its consent. Rather, the plain language of the 
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attorney fees provision simply states that "[t]he 
department may not pay more than 33% of its total 
recovery for attorney's fees." Id. § 26-19-7(4). 
Thus, in contrast to what the State suggests, the 
attorney fees portion of subsection (4) in no way 
limits the award of fees to recipients who obtained 
consent to pursue the State's claim. Moreover, the 
*577 State provides no statutory, case law, or policy 
ba^is for limiting awards of attorney fees to those 
recipients to whom the State, at its discretion, grants 
consent. We see no justification for so limiting the 
relatively broad reach of subsection (4) in the case 
before us. In fact, it would be inherently unfair not 
to award attorney fees to McCoy, who has followed 
the requirements of the Act in securing a recovery 
on behalf of his client.1^4 We therefore conclude 
that under subsection (4), when the State elects to 
recover directly from a recipient who has expressly 
excluded the State's claim from any attempt to 
recover from a third party, the State must pay the 
attorney fees incurred in procuring the State's share 
of the settlement proceeds.™5 
FN4. The State suggested at oral argument 
that McCoy should not be entitled to 
attorney fees because he failed to inform 
the State that Great American was the 
insurer with whom he was settling Sevey's 
claim. We emphasize that a recipient has 
a duty to cooperate with the State in 
identifying and providing information to 
assist the State in pursuing any third party 
who may be liable to pay for medical care 
and services. See42 C.F.R. § 433.147 
(1999); Utah Admin. Code R527-800-8, 
R527-936-2 (1997). Keeping the State 
informed ensures that the State will not be 
prejudiced in its efforts to recover medical 
benefits. For example, withholding the 
identity of the third party from the State 
may jeopardize the State's ability to 
preserve its claim against the third party. 
In order to bring a claim for 
reimbursement against a third party, the 
Act requires the State to provide notice of 
its lien to the third party before the third 
party settles with the recipient. SeeUtah 
Code Ann. § 26-19-5(3)(a) (1998). 
In the instant case, McCoy failed to keep 
the State minimally informed, but McCoy's 
lack of forthrightness did not prejudice the 
State's claim against the third party. Even 
though the State was unable to provide 
notice to the proper third party before the 
settlement, notice from the State is not 
necessary under the Act when "the third 
party had knowledge that the department 
provided or was obligated to provide 
medical assistance." Id. § 26-19-5(3)(b). 
McCoy informed the third party that the 
State had provided medical assistance to 
Sevey and that the State intended to 
enforce its lien directly against the third 
party. Thus, McCoy effectively preserved 
the State's right of action under the Act 
against the third party. We therefore need 
not address the question today of whether 
the legislature intended not to award 
attorney fees to a recipient whose "failure 
to cooperate" prevents the State from 
recovering from a third party. 
FN5, Having elected not to recover 
directly from the third party in the case 
before us, the State not only incurred a 
responsibility to pay attorney fees, but also 
effectively reduced Sevey's net recovery. 
As a result, neither the State nor Sevey will 
recover the $8,846.92 that Sevey excluded 
from his claim against the third party. 
This is because the State's lien under the 
Act is limited to the $8,846.92 of medical 
expenses that the State provided, and by 
enforcing its lien against McCoy, the State 
can no longer pursue its claim against the 
third party. Likewise, Sevey cannot seek 
the additional $8,846.92 because Sevey 
released the third party as a condition of 
settlement. 
[9] K 19 In sum, while the Act provides discretion 
to the State when selecting a suitable avenue for 
recovering medical assistance, each method of 
recovery requires the State to pay its share of 
attorney fees. The State may (1) take action 
directly against the third party, for which the State 
pays its own expenses; (2) grant consent to 
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recipients seeking to pursue the State's claim, 
whereby the State's recovery will be reduced by 
reasonable attorney fees and, if any, its 
proportionate share of the costs of an action; or (3) 
refuse consent and proceed against the recipient 
after the recipient recovers from the third party, in 
which case the State's recovery shall be reduced by 
reasonable attorney fees. 
f 20 We affirm the judgment of the trial court to 
the extent it held that the State is entitled to recover 
$8,846.92 from McCoy, but reverse to the extent 
the court failed to reduce the State's recovery by 
McCoy's reasonable attorney fees for procuring the 
State's share of the settlement proceeds. We 
therefore remand for a determination of attorney 
fees to be awarded McCoy and other appropriate 
action consistent with this opinion. 
% 21 Justice DURRANT concurs in Associate 
Chief Justice RUSSON's opinion.DURHAM, 
Justice, concurring: 
U 22 As the majority opinion notes in footnote 6, 
the State's actions in this case, although permitted 
by the statute, have in my view unfairly penalized 
the injured person. The injured person's net 
recovery has been *578 reduced by over $8,000 
because the State neither consented to allow the 
injured person to seek recovery for the State's claim 
against the third-party tortfeasor, nor itself sought 
such recovery. I hope that the legislature will 
reexamine this portion of the statute, which refills 
the state coffers out of money belonging to injured 
parties rather than the funds of the third-party 
tortfeasor liable for the injuries. The State is, of 
course, entitled to reimbursement, but it ought to 
have to "fish or cut bait" in the process of obtaining 
that reimbursement from third parties. 
WILKINS, Justice, concurring in part, dissenting in 
part: 
If 23 I respectfully dissent with respect to part III. 
I fully concur with the remainder of the majority 
opinion. 
1^ 24"In Utah, attorney fees are awardable only if 
authorized by statute or by contract." Dixie State 
Bank v. Bracken, 764 P.2d 985, 988 (Utah 1988). 
In this case, there is neither a contract nor a statute 
by which McCoy is entitled to fees from the State. 
K 25 There is no question that McCoy did not enter 
into a contractual arrangement with the Office of 
Recovery Services. He offered to do so, and to file 
a claim on behalf of the State for reimbursement for 
sums expended by the State. The State declined his 
offer. McCoy then filed his action seeking to 
recover for the injured Mr. Sevey an amount over 
and above that potentially due the State. 
^ 26 McCoy failed to alert the State when he 
discovered that he had previously misinformed the 
State of the proper insurance company. This 
failure significantly diminished the State's ability to 
alert the third party of the State's claim, or to 
participate in any settlement negotiations. McCoy 
rendered no service to the State that would have 
assisted the State in recovering its portion of the 
reimbursement directly from the third party. As 
authorized by statute,1^1 the State sought its 
recovery from the proceeds received by Mr. Sevey. 
The State has a statutory lien on this amount, FN2 
and any recovery accrues first to the State to 
replenish the public coffers prior to compensating 
either Mr. Sevey or his attorney. 
FN1. SeeUtah 
(1998). 
Code Ann. § 26-19-7(2) 
FN2. See id.§ 26-19-5(1). 
If 27 The majority relies upon the language of 
subsection (4) of section 26-19-7 in finding an 
obligation on the part of the State to pay McCoy an 
attorney fee from the recovered amount. 
Subsection (4) reads: 
(4) The department may not pay more than 33% of 
its total recovery for attorney's fees, but shall pay a 
proportionate share of the costs in an action that is 
commenced with the department's written consent. 
Utah Code Ann. § 26-19-7(4) (1998). I find 
nothing in this statutory language that requires any 
payment to McCoy when the department declined to 
give written consent. I read this language simply as 
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a limitation on the maximum fees that may be paid 
when written consent has been given, without a 
limitation on the State paying its proportionate 
share of costs for the same action. 
U 28 I disagree with my colleagues that the 
statutory language above quoted "in no way limits 
the award of fees to recipients who obtained 
consent to pursue the State's claim." I think it does 
just that: When an action is commenced with the 
State's consent, any payment for attorney fees by the 
State is limited to a maximum of 33% of its total 
recovery. Moreover, that is all the statute does. It 
simply does not address any obligation or lack of 
obligation to pay attorney fees when the State's 
consent is not given. 
K 29 I find no other statutory basis, nor do my 
colleagues identify one, that authorizes the State to 
pay McCoy his claimed fee from the public coffers. 
Absent a statute, or contract, providing such an 
authorization, I would hold that McCoy is not 
entitled to his fees in this case. 
U 30 The legislature has granted the Office of 
Recovery Services the discretion to consent or not 
to consent to the representation of a particular 
attorney. Even if this is "inherently unfair" as my 
colleagues suggest, it is simply the law: The policy 
choice has been made by the legislature in this 
instance, *579 and challenges to the fairness of the 
policy must be addressed to them. 
K 311 would affirm the judgment of the trial court. 
H 32 Chief Justice HOWE concurs in Justice 
WILKINS' concurring and dissenting opinion. 
Utah,2000. 
State ex rel. Office of Recovery Services v. McCoy 
999 P.2d 572, 393 Utah Adv. Rep. 17, 2000 UT 39 
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Houghton v. Department of Health 
Utah,2005. 
Supreme Court of Utah. 
Paul HOUGHTON and Billie Henderson, 
individually and each as representative of a class; 
and Damian Henderson, Wayne Rubens, Ron Roes, 
and Susan Roes, who are other members of these 
classes, similarly situated, Plaintiffs and Appellants, 
v. 
DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH; The Office of 
Recovery Services; The Department of Human 
Services; The State of Utah; Rod L. Betit, Director 
of the Department of Health and Director of 
Department of Human Services; Emma Chacone, 
Executive Director of the Office of Recovery 
Services; and John Does 1-50 and Jane Does 1-50, 
Defendants and Appellees. 
No. 20030931. 
(1) notice of claim by accident victims satisfied 
requirement of Governmental immunity Act; 
(2) an opinion interpreting scope of prior Supreme 
Court decision, affecting when State had to pay fees 
of attorneys who represented Medicaid recipients, 
would not be purely advisory, as clarifying the 
holding would have the effect of either expanding 
or contracting the scope of discovery and the 
composition of the class; and 
(3) State's obligation to pay its share of attorney 
fees of accident victims was not dependent upon 
whether the accident victims expressly excluded the 
State's claim when they pursued their claims against 
third parties. 
Reversed and remanded. 
Sept. 27, 2005. 
Rehearing Denied Nov. 7, 2005. 
Background: Accident victims who had received 
Medicaid assistance to pay their medical bills 
brought class action against Department of Health 
and the Office of Recovery Services (State) seeking 
recovery of monies paid to the State from 
settlements or judgments on victims' behalf. The 
District Court, Salt Lake County, Ronald Nehring, 
J., granted State's motion for summary judgment. 
Accident victims appealed. The Supreme Court, 57 
P.3d 1067, affirmed in part, reversed in part, and 
remanded. On remand, the Third District, Salt Lake, 
Anthony B. Quinn, J., denied accident victims' 
motion to compel discovery and granted State's 
motion for a protective order. Accident victims 
petitioned for interlocutory appeal. 
Holdings: After granting petition, the Supreme 
Court, Parrish, J., held that: 
See also 962 P.2d 58. 
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*862 Robert B. Sykes, Alyson Carter, Robert J. 
Fuller, Salt Lake City, for plaintiffs. 
Mark L. Shurtleff, Att'y Gen., Brent A. Burnett, 
Asst. Att'y Gen., Salt Lake City, for defendants. 
PARRISH, Justice: 
T[ 1 In 1995, plaintiffs filed suit against the 
Department of Health, the Office of Recovery 
Services, the State of Utah, and individual 
defendants (collectively, the "State"), seeking the 
return of monies paid to the State from settlements 
or judgments entered on plaintiffs' behalf. After 
several years of protracted motion practice and two 
appeals to this court, plaintiffs now appeal the 
district court's interlocutory order limiting the scope 
of discovery. The district court based its *863 
order on its interpretation of Utah case law. 
Because we conclude that the district court erred in 
its interpretation, we reverse and remand. 
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[^ 2 As a result of injuries they sustained in 
separate accidents, plaintiffs Paul Houghton, Billie 
and Damien Henderson, and Wayne Rubens each 
received Medicaid assistance to pay their medical 
bills. After plaintiffs sought compensation for their 
injuries from potentially liable third parties, the 
State, pursuant to section 26-19-5 of the Utah Code 
(the "lien statute"), FN1 placed reimbursement liens 
on any settlement or judgment proceeds in order to 
recover the Medicaid assistance it had paid on 
plaintiffs' behalf. 
FN1. At all times relevant to this action, 
subsection (1) of section 26-19-5 provided: 
(1) (a) When the department provides or 
becomes obligated to provide medical 
assistance to a recipient because of an 
injury, disease, or disability that a third 
party is obligated to pay for, the 
department may recover the medical 
assistance directly from that third party, 
(b) The department's claim to recover 
medical assistance provided as a result of 
the injury, disease, or disability is a lien 
against any proceeds payable to or on 
behalf of the recipient by that third party. 
This lien has priority over all other claims 
to the proceeds, except claims for 
attorney's fees and costs authorized under 
Subsection 26-19-7(4). 
Utah Code Ann. § 26-19-5(1) (1998). 
This subsection was amended in 2004 and 
now reads as follows: 
(1) (a) When the department provides or 
becomes obligated to provide medical 
assistance to a recipient that a third party is 
obligated to pay for, the department may 
recover the medical assistance directly 
from that third party. 
(b) Any claim arising under Subsection 
(l)(a) or Section 26-19-4.5 to recover 
medical assistance provided to a recipient 
is a lien against any proceeds payable to or 
on behalf of the recipient by that third 
party. This lien has priority over all other 
claims to the proceeds, except claims for 
attorney's fees and costs authorized under 
Subsection 26-19-7(4). 
Id. § 26-19-5(1) (Supp.2004). Because 
the 1998 version of section 26-19-5 was 
applicable at all times relevant to this 
action, all subsequent references to this 
section are to the 1998 version. 
K 3 Alleging that the lien statute violated federal 
law, plaintiffs filed a notice of claim with the State 
pursuant to the provisions of the Utah 
Governmental Immunity Act (the "Immunity Act"). 
FN2
 The notice stated that plaintiffs "intendfed] to 
bring a class action" to recover "the money [the 
State] took illegally by liening their property ... plus 
any interest, costs and attorneys fees." Plaintiffs 
attached to their notice a draft complaint, which 
sought the return of all "monies ... illegally and 
unlawfully taken" and "attorneys fees as allowed by 
law." 
FN2. In 2004, the Utah Legislature 
repealed the Utah Governmental Immunity 
Act, sections 63-30-1 to -38, enacting in its 
place sections 63-30d-101 to -904. Act of 
Mar. 3, 2004, ch. 267, 2004 Utah Laws 
1171. In so doing, the legislature 
acknowledged its intent that all "injuries 
alleged to be caused by a governmental 
entity that occurred before July 1, 2004, be 
governed by the provisions" of the former 
Act Id. § 48, at 1215. Because the 
injuries alleged by plaintiffs in this case 
occurred prior to July 1, 2004, the former 
Act governs and all references in this 
opinion are to that Act. 
H 4 On October 27, 1995, plaintiffs filed suit 
against the State, alleging that the lien statute was 
illegal because it violated federal law prohibiting 
the filing of liens against the property of living 
Medicaid recipients. On December 18, 1995, 
plaintiffs moved to certify their suit as a class 
action, and on January 29, 1996, the district court 
granted the motion, certifying two classes of 
plaintiffs. Class I consisted of Medicaid recipients 
with third-party liability claims who received 
settlements or judgments from liable third parties 
from which the State's reimbursement liens were 
paid. Class II plaintiffs were identical to Class I 
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plaintiffs with the exception that Class II plaintiffs 
had "retained counsel and actually filed actions or 
made claims through attorneys[ ] against the liable 
third parties." 
^ 5 After plaintiffs filed a notice of deposition and 
request for document production, the State moved 
to disqualify plaintiffs' attorneys, asserting that their 
re£>resentation of plaintiffs gave rise to a conflict of 
interest in violation of rule 1.9 of the Utah Rules of 
Professional Conduct because plaintiffs' attorneys 
had previously represented the State in personal 
injury actions brought by Medicaid recipients. In 
addition, the State sought *864 a protective order to 
delay discovery pending the resolution of its motion 
to disqualify. The district court granted both 
motions. Plaintiffs petitioned this court for 
permission to file an interlocutory appeal, which we 
granted. In that appeal, we reversed the district 
court, holding that plaintiffs' counsel did not violate 
rule 1.9 of the Utah Rules of Professional Conduct. 
Houghton v. Dep't of Health, 962 P.2d 58, 63 (Utah 
1998). On remand, the district court reinstated 
plaintiffs' counsel. 
^ 6 In late 1998, this court issued two opinions 
affirming the validity of the lien statute. See S.S. v. 
State, 972 P.2d 439, 442 (Utah 1998); Wallace v. 
Estate of Jackson, 972 P.2d 446, 448 (Utah 1998). 
Arguing that those opinions completely disposed of 
plaintiffs' claims, the State moved for judgment on 
the pleadings. While plaintiffs conceded that S.S. 
and Wallace gutted their challenge to the validity of 
the lien statute, they maintained the viability of their 
other claims. The district court granted the State's 
motion for judgment on the pleadings on all of 
plaintiffs' claims except their claim seeking the 
State's contribution to their attorney fees. 
U 7 Undeterred, the State filed another motion 
directed at plaintiffs' claim for attorney fees. The 
State argued that it was entitled to summary 
judgment on that claim because the named plaintiffs 
either never incurred attorney fees or already had 
been compensated by the State for its share of fees. 
Plaintiffs opposed the State's motion and also 
sought reconsideration of the district court's ruling 
disposing of their other claims. Plaintiffs argued 
that, in addition to their claim for attorney fees, they 
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should be allowed to proceed with their claim 
seeking to invalidate the priority status of the State's 
lien. 
f 8 The district court disposed of both motions in 
an order dated November 13, 2000. It denied 
plaintiffs' motion for reconsideration, citing this 
court's decision in State ex rel Office of Recovery 
Services v. McCoy, 2000 UT 39, 999 P.2d 572, and 
it granted the State's motion for summary judgment, 
declaring that "no issues related to a named plaintiff 
or class representative remain unresolved." 
U 9 Plaintiffs again appealed to this court, arguing 
that the district court erred in (1) granting the State's 
motion for judgment on the pleadings with respect 
to their claim challenging the validity of the lien's 
priority status, and (2) granting the State's motion 
for summary judgment on the Class II plaintiffs' 
claims for attorney fees. 
% 10 In Houghton v. Department of Health, 2002 
UT 101, 57 P.3d 1067, we affirmed the district 
court's grant of judgment on the pleadings, holding 
that "the priority lien on Medicaid recipients' 
third-party settlement proceeds did not violate 
federal law." Id. K 9. However, we reversed the 
summary judgment on the Class II plaintiffs' claim 
for attorney fees and remanded the case to the 
district court for further proceedings on that claim. 
Id. K 10. 
[^ 11 On remand, the Class II plaintiffs moved to 
compel discovery. Again, the State fired up its 
motion machine. It moved to dismiss without 
prejudice the Class II plaintiffs' remaining claim for 
attorney fees, arguing that the district court lacked 
subject matter jurisdiction over that claim because 
plaintiffs had failed to comply with the Immunity 
Act. In the alternative, the State argued that the 
district court should compel plaintiffs to add a new 
Class II representative because none of the named 
representatives could assert a valid claim for 
attorney fees. The State also moved to stay all 
discovery pending the district court's resolution of 
its motion to dismiss, which the district court 
denied. Thereafter, plaintiffs moved to add 
additional Class II representatives, and the State 
responded by filing an additional motion to dismiss. 
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The State asserted that the district court lacked 
jurisdiction over those additional plaintiffs sought 
to be named as Class II representatives, as well as 
all other unnamed Class II plaintiffs, because the 
notice of claim filed with the State had not 
specifically listed them. Additionally, the State 
moved for a protective order, arguing that plaintiffs' 
discovery requests were overly broad and unduly 
burdensome, and sought protected information. The 
district court granted plaintiffs' motion to add Class 
II representatives and denied the State's motions 
*865 to dismiss. The State then moved to 
decertify the class. 
[^ 12 On November 3, 2003, in an order disposing 
of the remaining motions before it, the district court 
(1) denied plaintiffs' motion to compel discovery, 
(2) granted the State's motion for a protective order, 
limiting the discovery that plaintiffs could seek, and 
(3) delayed a decision on the State's motion for 
decertification of the class until after the parties 
completed the discovery allowed under the terms of 
the protective order. 
U 13 The district court based its November 3, 2003 
order on the holding of McCoy, which, it declared, " 
is found in the last sentence of paragraph 18 of that 
case." That sentence reads: 
We therefore conclude that under subsection (4), 
when the State elects to recover directly from a 
recipient who has expressly excluded the State's 
claim from any attempt to recover from a third 
party, the State must pay the attorney fees incurred 
in procuring the State's share of the settlement 
proceeds. 
McCoy, 2000 UT 39, f 18, 999 P.2d 572. The 
district court accordingly limited the scope of 
discovery to that which was necessary to identify 
Medicaid recipients falling within its interpretation 
of the holding of McCoy. On November 21, 2003, 
plaintiffs petitioned for permission to appeal the 
district court's interlocutory discovery order, 
arguing that the district court's interpretation of 
McCoy was erroneous. We granted plaintiffs' 
petition on January 15, 2004, and have jurisdiction 
pursuant to Utah Code section 78-2-2(3)(j) (2002). 
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\ 14 Plaintiffs argue that the district court erred in 
interpreting the holding of State ex rel Office oj 
Recovery Services v. McCoy, 2000 UT 39, 999 P.2d 
572. Contrary to the district court's interpretation, 
plaintiffs maintain that McCoy requires the State to 
pay its fair share of attorney fees in all instances 
where the State obtains its lien reimbursement from 
the proceeds of a settlement or judgment procured 
through the efforts of a Medicaid recipient's private 
attorney. Before we reach this issue, however, we 
must address the preliminary arguments raised by 
the State. Specifically, the State contends that (1) 
we cannot address plaintiffs' claims because we lack 
subject matter jurisdiction to do so; and (2) 
assuming we have jurisdiction, we should 
nevertheless decline to further interpret McCoy 
because doing so would constitute an impermissible 
advisory opinion. 
I. SUBJECT MATTER JURISDICTION 
K 15 The State contends that we lack subject 
matter jurisdiction over this case because plaintiffs 
failed to comply with the Immunity Act. 
Specifically, the State argues that plaintiffs' notice 
of claim was deficient because it did not list all of 
the Class II plaintiffs and did not include a specific 
request for attorney fees under section 26-19-7 of 
the Utah Code. 
[1][2][3][4] U 16 Before reaching the substance of 
the State's jurisdictional claim, we must determine 
whether that claim falls within the scope of this 
interlocutory appeal. Although it is generally true 
that the issue of subject matter jurisdiction "is a 
threshold issue," which can be raised at any time 
and must be addressed before the merits of other 
claims, Hous. Auth. v. Snyder, 2002 UT 28, 1f 11, 
44 P.3d 724, this is not the case in the context of an 
interlocutory appeal. On interlocutory appeal, we 
review only those specific issues presented in the 
petition. See State v. Lusk, 2001 UT 102, % 32, 37 
P.3d 1103 (refusing to address a question because it 
was "beyond the scope of review for which we 
granted Lusk's petition for this interlocutory appeal" 
). Thus, we are not compelled to review subject 
matter jurisdiction if that issue was neither included 
in the petition for interlocutory appeal nor the 
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subject of a cross-petition See Mercury Mktg 
Techs of Del, Inc v State ex rel Beebe, No 
03-1382, 358 Ark 319, —SW3d — , — , 2004 
WL 1475391, 2004 Ark LEXIS 447, at *13-14 
(Ark July 1, 2004) (declining to address "whether 
the circuit court erred in finding that it had 
subject-matter jurisdiction over the action, because 
this went beyond the scope of the interlocutory 
aripeal") Nevertheless, because the issue of 
subject matter jurisdiction will always bear some 
relationship*866 to the interlocutory orders 
presented for review, we retain the discretion to 
address subject matter jurisdiction on interlocutory 
appeal m those cases where we deem it appropriate 
Where we decline to do so, the parties may appeal 
the issue of subject matter jurisdiction once a final 
decision has been rendered, as mere demal of a 
petition for interlocutory appeal does not 
necessanly act as a judgment on the merits, see 
Mountain States Tel & Tel Co v Atkin, Wright & 
Miles, 681 P2d 1258, 1263 (Utah 1984), and " c 
challenges to subject matter jurisdiction cannot 
be waived,' " Chen v Stewart, 2004 UT 82, 1J 34, 
100 P 3d 1177 (quotmg Barnard v Wassermann, 
855 P 2d 243, 248 (Utah 1993)) 
Tf 17 Because of the lengthy procedural history m 
this case, we believe that it is appropriate to address 
the issue of subject matter jurisdiction at this stage, 
even though it is not within the scope of the petition 
for interlocutory appeal Accordingly, we exercise 
our discretion to review the issue of whether 
plaintiffs complied with the Immunity Act, thereby 
vesting the district court with subject matter 
jurisdiction over their claims agamst the State 
[5][6] \ 18 The Immunity Act, sections 63-30-1 to 
-38 of the Utah Code, "grants the state and its 
political subdivisions 'broad, background immunity 
' from injuries that result due to the exercise of a 
governmental function" Wheeler v McPherson, 
2002 UT 16, H 10, 40 P 3d 632 (quoting Hall v 
State Dep't of Corr, 2001 UT 34, \ 18, 24 P 3d 
958) The Act waives this immunity for certain 
claims and specifies the procedures that claimants 
must follow in order to maintain an action agamst 
the State or its political subdivisions SeeUtah 
Code Ann §§ 63-30-4 to -13 (1997) In Wheeler, 
we reasoned that, " '[w]here the government grants 
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statutory rights of action agamst itself, any 
conditions placed on those rights must be followed 
precisely' " 2002 UT 16, % 11, 40 P 3d 632 
(quotmg Hall, 2001 UT 34, H 23, 24 P 3d 958) 
Accordmgly, "[compliance with the Immumty Act 
is a prerequisite to vestmg a district court with 
subject matter jurisdiction over claims against 
governmental entities " Id ^ 9. 
[7] [8] K 19 The State alleges two deficiencies m 
plaintiffs' notice of claim First, the State contends 
that the notice failed to sufficiently articulate the 
claim for attorney fees that plaintiffs now seek 
Second, the State contends that the notice was 
ineffective because it did not identify by name all of 
the plaintiffs to this action Plaintiffs disagree, 
asserting that their notice was sufficient 
Alternatively, plaintiffs argue that they were not 
required to comply with the notice of claim 
requirements because their claims are equitable m 
natureFN3 Because we conclude that plaintiffs' 
notice of claim satisfied the requirements of the 
Immunity Act, it is unnecessary for us to address 
whether plaintiffs' claims are, m actuality, equitable 
FN3 This court has recognized that 
equitable claims are not governed by the 
notice of claim provisions of the Immunity 
Act For example, m El Rancho 
Enterprises, Inc v Murray City Corp, 
565 P 2d 778, 780 (Utah 1977), we noted 
that "an equitable claim may be brought 
without the necessity of first presenting a 
claim for damages " See also Am Tierra 
Corp v City of W Jordan, 840 P 2d 757, 
760 (Utah 1992) (holding that equitable 
claims are "exempt from the filing 
requirements and time limits imposed by 
the Immunity Act"), Jenkins v Swan, 
675 P2d 1145, 1154 (Utah 1983) (" 
[Ejquitable claims are exempt from the 
notice requirements") Thus, a plaintiff 
asserting an equitable claim is not bound 
by the notice requirements of the Immunity 
Act 
[9] H 20Section 63-30-11 of the Immunity Act 
provides that "[a]ny person havmg a claim for 
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injury against a governmental entity ... shall file a 
written notice of claim with the entity before 
maintaining an action." Utah Code Ann. § 
63-30-11(2). The notice must contain "(i) a brief 
statement of the facts; (ii) the nature of the claim 
asserted; and (iii) the damages incurred by the 
claimant so far as they are known." Id. § 
63-30-1 l(3)(a). The purpose of the notice "is to * 
provide[ ] the governmental entity an opportunity to 
correct the condition that caused the injury, evaluate 
the claim, and perhaps settle the matter without the 
expense of litigation.' " Pigs Gun Club, Inc. v. 
Sanpete County, 2002 UT 17, H 10, 42 P.3d 379 
(quoting Larson v. Park City Mun. Corp., 955 P.2d 
343, 345-46 (Utah 1998)) (alteration in *867 
original). To ensure that this purpose is fulfilled, 
we have repeatedly required strict compliance with 
the notice of claim provisions. For example, in 
Wheeler,"w reiteratefd] ... that the Immunity Act 
demands strict compliance with its requirements to 
allow suit against governmental entities. The 
notice of claim provision, particularly, neither 
contemplates nor allows for anything less." 2002 
UT 16, % 13, 40 P.3d 632 (emphasis added). 
[10] Tf 21 Although we have mandated strict 
compliance with the notice of claim procedures, we 
have not required that such notices " 'meet the 
standards required to state a claim for relief " 
Peeples v. State, 2004 UT App 328, K 11, 100 
P.3d 254 (quoting Behrens v. Raleigh Hills Hosp., 
Inc., 675 P.2d 1179, 1183 (Utah 1983)). Rather, a 
plaintiff need only include "enough specificity in 
the notice to inform as to the nature of the claim so 
that the defendant can appraise its potential liability. 
" Years ley v. Jensen, 798 P.2d 1127, 1129 (Utah 
1990). Applying this standard, we conclude that 
plaintiffs' notice of claim satisfied the requirements 
of the Immunity Act with respect to both its 
description of the claims and its identification of the 
plaintiffs. 
^ 22 First, we conclude that plaintiffs satisfied the 
requirement to "set forth ... the nature of the claim 
asserted,"Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-1 l(3)(a)(ii), 
thereby affording the State an opportunity "to 
appraise its potential liability," Yearsley, 798 P.2d 
at 1129. Plaintiffs attached a draft complaint to 
their notice. The draft included several statements 
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that sufficiently communicated plaintiffs, claim for 
attorney fees. For example, the draft complaint 
requested "attorneys' fees as may be provided by 
law." Because plaintiffs seek recovery of attorney 
fees under section 26-19-7 of the Utah Code, they 
are seeking recovery of attorney fees "as may be 
provided by law." Additionally, although 
plaintiffs' draft complaint focused heavily on the 
issue of the lien statute's constitutionality, it also 
sought relief for "monies ... [that] were illegally and 
unlawfully taken." Because plaintiffs may be 
entitled to contribution from the State for attorney 
fees under section 26-19-7, any retention of those 
fees by the State would constitute "monies illegally 
and unlawfully taken." 
H 23 Moreover, plaintiffs should not be penalized 
because their notice of claim failed to accurately 
predict future developments in the law. When 
plaintiffs filed their notice, the question of the lien 
statute's constitutionality had yet to be decided. 
Because plaintiffs were challenging the validity of 
the State's entire lien, it was unnecessary for them to 
also include a separate claim seeking recovery of 
only their attorney fees. The fact that this court 
subsequently upheld the lien statute's 
constitutionality should not bar plaintiffs' attempt to 
recover a portion of the funds they originally 
sought. We therefore conclude that plaintiffs' 
notice of claim was sufficient to communicate the 
nature of the claim they now assert. 
[11] U 24 We similarly conclude that plaintiffs' 
notice of claim was not deficient even though it did 
not expressly include the name of each potential 
Class II plaintiff. Relying on our holding in Pigs 
Gun Club, 2002 UT 17, 42 P.3d 379, the State 
asserts that a notice of claim must contain the name 
of each individual plaintiff. In Pigs Gun Club, we 
declared that "[section 63-30-11] itself clearly 
requires any person filing suit against a 
governmental agency to file a notice of claim. In 
other words, each plaintiffs name must be on the 
notice of claim." Id. ^ 10 (citation omitted). 
Unlike this case, however, Pigs Gun Club was not a 
class action. That distinction is significant because 
interpreting the notice of claim provision to require 
identification of every potential plaintiff in a class 
action lawsuit would nullify our class action rule, 
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which provides that "[o]ne or more members of a 
class may sue or be sued as representative parties 
on behalf of all." Utah R. Civ. P. 23(a) (emphasis 
added). Nothing in the Immunity Act suggests that 
the State declined to waive immunity from class 
action lawsuits. Accordingly, we hold that a claim 
providing notice of a possible class action lawsuit 
satisfies the requirements of the Immunity Act if it 
isA filed by a class representative on behalf of 
potential class members. Cf. Moreno v. Bd. oj 
Educ, 926 P.2d 886, 892 (Utah 1996) (holding that 
the notice of claim filed by a *868 guardian in a 
wrongful death action, even though erroneously 
filed on the guardian's own behalf, was sufficient to 
preserve the parent's claim because the guardian 
was legally authorized to file a claim on behalf of 
the parent). The notice of claim in this case met 
that requirement. It was filed by the claimants " 
individually and ... as representative^] of a class." 
Because plaintiffs' notice of claim complied with 
the requirements of the Immunity Act, we hold that 
we possess subject matter jurisdiction over their 
claims against the State. 
II. ADVISORY OPINION 
Tf 25 Plaintiffs sought interlocutory review of the 
protective order entered by the district court. On 
appeal, however, plaintiffs do not restrict their 
arguments to the scope of the protective order. 
Rather, they assert that "a number of other 
questions have arisen regarding [our opinion in 
McCoy, 2000 UT 39] that should be resolved to 
avoid further appeals." The State contends that the 
district court correctly applied the McCoy decision 
when fashioning the protective order and that 
plaintiffs' request for additional guidance in 
interpreting McCoy calls for an impermissible 
advisory opinion. 
[12] f 26 We repeatedly have declined invitations 
to issue advisory opinions. In State v. Ortiz, 1999 
UT 84, 987 P.2d 39, we declared: 
"This court will not issue advisory opinions or 
examine a controversy that has not yet sharpened 
into an actual or imminent clash of legal rights and 
obligations between the parties thereto. Where 
there exists no more than a difference of opinion 
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regarding the hypothetical application of a piece of 
legislation to a situation in which the parties might, 
at some future time, find themselves, the question is 
unripe for adjudication." 
Id. ^ 3 (quoting State v. Herrera, 895 P.2d 359, 
371 (Utah 1995) (further quotations omitted)); see 
also Provo City Corp. v. Thompson, 2004 UT 14, ^ 
22, 86 P.3d 735 ("We have observed on many 
occasions that this court is not inclined to issue 
mere advisory opinions."(internal quotations 
omitted)). An opinion is not merely advisory, 
however, if it will, in fact, have a "meaningful effect 
" on the parties. See Thompson, 2004 UT 14, f 
22, 86 P.3d 735. The opinion we are asked to 
render in this case would have such an effect. 
[13] K 27 The scope of the protective order sentered 
by the district court was dependent on its 
interpretation of McCoy. After limiting discovery 
to issues relevant to class certification, the district 
court defined the scope of permissible discovery, 
stating that "[p]laintiffs^ may thereby pursue .the 
identification of recipients who fall within the 
holding of the McCoy case as construed by this 
Order." Clarifying the holding of McCoy will have 
the effect of either expanding or contracting the 
scope of discovery and will define the composition 
of the class. Thus, our opinion will have a " 
meaningful effect" on the parties. 
f^ 28 Although we are obliged to decide whether 
the protective order was grounded upon the correct 
interpretation of McCoy, we agree with the State 
that plaintiffs have asked us to address other issues 
that do not bear upon the scope of the protective 
order.FN4 Because it would be inappropriate for us 
to address all of the hypothetical "related questions" 
posed by plaintiffs, we will restrict our opinion to 
the appropriate scope of the protective order, 
addressing the related questions only to the extent 
that they have a bearing on the scope of that order. 
Indeed, it would be premature for us to opine as to 
plaintiffs' entitlement to attorney fees in all of the 
fact scenarios contemplated by their questions when 
discovery has yet to reveal whether those scenarios 
are even present in this case. 
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FN4. For example, plaintiffs ask us to 
opine as to whether the State's obligation 
to pay "its fair share of a recipient's 
attorney fees [is] dependent upon the 
degree of cooperation by the recipient." 
They further ask whether the State should 
be required to "pay a fair share of a 
recipient's attorney fees if it hires its own 
attorney." 
f 29 Before addressing the scope of the protective 
order, we pause to note that the apparent confusion 
in this area of the law and the number of situations 
unaddressed by *869 the Medicaid lien statute cry 
out for legislative attention. This is especially so 
given the frequency with which this court has been 
confronted with disputes regarding application of 
the lien statute. 
H 30 It is clear that the State has a legitimate and 
definite interest in obtaining reimbursement of 
funds paid to Medicaid recipients. This interest 
would appear to be furthered by a scheme in which 
private attorneys - have an incentive to seek 
recoveries benefitting the State. However, without 
a definitive set of parameters defining the terms and 
conditions under which private attorneys will be 
compensated for their efforts, those attorneys will 
have little or no incentive to seek recoveries 
benefitting the State.™5 Consequently, the State, 
the Medicaid recipients, and the private attorneys 
who represent them would all benefit from 
definable rules and a clear expression of policy in 
this area. 
FN5. The State argues persuasively that it 
should not be forced to pay fees to private 
attorneys for obtaining Medicaid 
reimbursement in those cases where the 
State could have secured the 
reimbursement itself with little or no effort. 
On the other hand, plaintiffs argue 
persuasively that the State often refuses to 
compensate the attorneys of Medicaid 
recipients in cases where the State's 
reimbursement is entirely attributable to 
the efforts of private attorneys and where 
the State would not otherwise have 
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obtained a recovery. Plaintiffs assert that 
it is fundamentally unfair to allow the State 
a "free ride" in such situations and that the 
"free ride [will] be the last ride when 
attorneys discover there is no incentive to 
take a recipient's case if all proceeds are 
taken by the State." 
f 31 The legislature, with its ability to "provide a 
forum for full discussion and consideration of the 
pros and cons of the problems involved, and to 
enact into law those policies which, in [its] 
judgment, will best serve the common welfare," 
Stoker v. Stoker, 616 P.2d 590, 592 (Utah 1980) 
(Crockett, C.J., dissenting), is the appropriate body 
to undertake this task. Furthermore, because the 
legislature, unlike this court, is not constrained to 
address a single case at a time, it is able to devise a 
comprehensive scheme, providing predictability and 
appropriate incentives to the State, the Medicaid 
recipients, and their private attorneys. We hope the 
legislature will do so. 
III. DID THE DISTRICT COURT 
ERRONEOUSLY INTERPRET 
Citing our holding in McCoy, the district court ruled 
that plaintiffs were entitled to recover attorney fees 
from the State only in cases where "the State elects 
to recover directly from a recipient who has 
expressly excluded the State's claim from any 
attempt to recover from a third party." State ex rel. 
Office of Recovery Servs. v. McCoy, 2000 UT 39, ^ 
18, 999 P.2d 572. The protective order entered by 
the district court limited discovery accordingly. 
Plaintiffs contend that the district court's ruling on 
this issue was erroneous. Specifically, they assert 
that they are entitled to recover attorney fees from 
the State in any case where the State obtained a lien 
reimbursement through the efforts of a recipient's 
private attorney. The State counters that attorney 
fees may be recovered only in those cases where (1) 
the recipient requested consent, (2) the recipient 
excluded from his or her claim the amount of the 
State's lien, and (3) the State failed to seek 
reimbursement from the liable party and elected 
instead to obtain reimbursement directly from the 
Medicaid recipient. 
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[14] [^ 32 Interpreting case law presents a question 
of law. State ex rel. Office of Recovery Servs. v. 
Streight, 2004 UT 88, If 6, 108 P.3d 690. 
Accordingly, we review the district court's 
interpretation of our ruling in McCoy for 
correctness. Id. 
U 33 Plaintiffs' entitlement to attorney fees in 
Medicaid lien cases is governed by section 26-19-7 
of the Utah Code, which provides: 
(l)(a) A recipient may not file a claim, commence 
an action, or settle, compromise, release, or waive a 
claim against a third party for recovery of medical 
costs for an injury, disease, or disability for which 
the department has provided or has become 
obligated to provide medical assistance, without the 
department's written consent. 
(4) The department may not pay more than 33% of 
its total recovery for attorney's*870 fees, but shall 
pay a proportionate share of the costs in an action 
that is commenced with the department's written 
consent. 
Utah Code Ann. § 26-19-7(1), (4) (1998). 
If 34 In McCoy, we were asked to consider whether 
the defendant, an attorney hired by a Medicaid 
recipient to recover damages for an injury he 
sustained in a slip and fall, was entitled to attorney 
fees from the State under section 26-19-7(4). 2000 
UT 39, ffif 2-3, 13, 999 P.2d 572. Before 
initiating any claim or suit against the liable third 
party, McCoy requested consent from the State to 
bring a claim on its behalf. Id. If 3. The State 
refused. Id. Thereafter, McCoy filed a claim 
against the liable third party, expressly excluding 
the State's claim for the medical assistance it had 
provided. Id. Iflf 3-4. The liable third party 
agreed to settle the claim and paid the Medicaid 
recipient. Id. If 5. The State then filed suit against 
McCoy to recover its lien from the settlement 
proceeds held in trust by McCoy. Id. If 6. McCoy 
resisted, arguing that because he had excluded the 
State's claim, the State was not entitled to any 
proceeds that he obtained. Id. % 11. 
% 35 This court rejected McCoy's argument, 
holding that the Utah Medical Benefits Recovery 
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Act, Utah Code Ann. §§ 26-19-1 to -19 (1998) 
(amended 2004), entitled the State to the proceeds 
and superseded any efforts by McCoy to insulate his 
client's recovery from the State's reach. McCoy, 
2000 UT 39, 1f 12, 999 P.2d 572. Thus, to the 
extent McCoy attempted to utilize his exclusion of 
the State's claim as a tactic to avoid satisfying the 
State's lien, this court rejected that tactic. We did, 
however, allow McCoy to recover a proportionate 
share of his attorney fees from the State, reasoning 
that McCoy had "followed the requirements of the 
Act" by asking for the State's consent. Id. f 18. 
1f 36 The State asserts that the district court was 
correct in limiting the holding of McCoy to the last 
sentence of the eighteenth paragraph, where we 
declared: 
We therefore conclude that under subsection (4), 
when the State elects to recover directly from a 
recipient who has expressly excluded the State's 
claim from any attempt to recover from a third 
party, the State must pay the attorney fees incurred 
in procuring the State's share of the settlement 
proceeds. 
Id. (emphasis added). 
1f 37 Contrary to the State's assertion, this language 
does not constitute McCoy's holding of general 
application. When read in the context of the 
opinion as a whole, it is apparent that this language 
constitutes only the ruling, or the application of the 
general holding to the specific facts of the case. 
See Black's Law Dictionary 1334 (7th ed.1999) 
(noting that "[I]n common usage 'legal ruling' ... is 
a term ordinarily used to signify the outcome of 
applying a legal test when that outcome is one of 
relatively narrow impact. The immediate effect is 
to decide an issue in a single case."(internal 
quotations omitted)). We acknowledged as much 
in McCoy, in the sentences immediately preceding 
the passage now cited by the State as the "holding," 
when we stated: 
We see no justification for so limiting the relatively 
broad reach of subsection (4) in the case before us. 
In fact, it would be inherently unfair not to award 
attorney fees to McCoy, who has followed the 
requirements of the Act in securing a recovery on 
behalf of his client. We therefore conclude that 
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under subsection (4), when the State elects to 
recover directly from a recipient who has expressly 
excluded the State's claim from any attempt to 
recover from a third party, the State must pay the 
attorney fees incurred in procuring the State's share 
of the settlement proceeds. 
Id* (emphasis added). In short, our specific ruling 
in McCoy was based on the fact that the State 
sought to recover its lien directly from the recipient 
after McCoy had requested, and was denied, 
consent and after the recipient had excluded the 
State's claim from his efforts to obtain a recovery. 
At IK 3, 6. 
TI 38 In this case, we are asked to clarify the 
holding of McCoy as it relates to the scope of a 
discovery order concerning potential class 
members. Under such a circumstance, there is no 
need to restrict discovery to the class of cases that 
present fact patterns identical to the one presented 
in *871 McCoy. In a context where few, if any, 
facts have been developed, it is necessary to reach 
beyond the narrow, fact-specific ruling of McCoy 
and apply its broader, more general holding. 
Doing otherwise would artificially and illogically 
restrict discovery and, concomitantly, the size of the 
potential class. Until the facts surrounding the 
claims of each potential class member have been 
developed, it will be impossible for the court to 
assess whether they fall within the general holding 
of McCoy. 
% 39 In an effort to define the appropriate scope of 
the protective order, we return to the underpinnings 
of our decision in McCoy. In McCoy, we 
concluded that the State was obligated to pay a 
proportionate share of the plaintiffs attorney fees 
because the plaintiff complied with section 26-19-7 
of the Medicaid lien statute. Id. ^ 18. We based 
this conclusion on the fact that McCoy had 
requested consent to pursue the State's claim. 
^ 40 Our reliance on this factor was mandated by 
the terms of the lien statute, which prohibits a 
Medicaid recipient from seeking recovery of funds 
advanced by the State without the State's written 
consent. Utah Code Ann. § 26-19-7. Where 
Medicaid recipients failed to comply with the 
statute, they were not entitled to a contribution from 
the State for their attorney fees. The lien statute 
fails to address, however, the State's obligation to 
pay its fair share of attorney fees in those cases 
where consent was requested from, but denied by, 
the State and the State nevertheless elects to obtain 
its recovery from the proceeds obtained through the 
efforts of a Medicaid recipient's attorney. 
Accordingly, 
[i]n McCoy, on grounds of fairness, we interpreted 
the statute to imply an obligation on the part of the 
State to pay fees where the attorney acted in 
compliance with the statute, requesting consent to 
pursue an action and then preserving the State's 
independent right to recover by excluding the 
State's claim from any action filed on behalf of the 
injured party. 
Streight, 2004 UT 88, f 13, 108 P.3d €90. This 
holding "struck a balance between the State's 
interest in protecting itself from collusive efforts to 
place otherwise reimbursable funds beyond its reach 
and the interest of private attorneys in being 
compensated for obtaining recoveries benefitting 
the State." Id. 
\ 41 The question left open by our decision in 
McCoy, and our subsequent decision in Streight, is 
whether the State's obligation to pay its fair share of 
attorney fees is limited to cases exactly like McCoy, 
where the recipient expressly excluded the State's 
claim and the State recovered its lien directly from 
the proceeds paid to the Medicaid recipient. In its 
effort to limit its obligation to such cases, the State 
relies on language from McCoy suggesting that the 
State is not obligated to pay attorney fees if it elects 
to recover its lien directly from the liable third 
party. See McCoy, 2000 UT 39, ffil 18-19, 999 
P.2d 572. In so arguing, however, the State 
overemphasizes the particular language at the 
expense of the underlying principle. 
1f 42 In McCoy, we noted that, "[hjaving elected 
not to recover directly from the third party ..., the 
State not only incurred a responsibility to pay 
attorney fees, but also effectively reduced [the 
recipient's] net recovery." Id. f 18 n. 5. The 
phrase "recover directly from the third party" was 
used to identify those cases where the State 
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recovered its lien independent of the recipient's 
settlement and thereby did not reduce the amount 
recovered by the recipient. That language was not 
intended to encompass situations in which the 
State's lien was paid directly from the settlement 
proceeds obtained through the efforts of the 
recipient's attorney. After refusing to consent to 
representation by the recipient's attorney, the State 
should not be free to recover its lien from the 
settlement or judgment obtained through the efforts 
of the recipient's attorney without incurring the 
obligation to pay its fair share of attorney fees. 
Tf 43 Moreover, the State's obligation for fees 
should not be dependent upon whether the State 
obtained its reimbursement directly from the 
Medicaid recipient or whether it was able to arrange 
for payment directly from the liable third party. 
Permitting the State to circumvent any obligation 
for attorney fees by arranging for payment directly 
from a liable third party, even though the *872 
settlement or judgment from which the lien is paid 
was procured through the efforts of the recipient's 
attorney, would sanction the State's abrogation of its 
responsibility to recover its lien "by relying on 
Medicaid recipients to act, usually unwittingly, on 
the State's behalf." Streight, 2004 UT 88, \ 21, 
108 P.3d 690 (Durham, C.J., dissenting). Such a 
result would defeat the equitable basis for our ruling 
in McCoy. See id. ^ 13 (majority opinion). 
\ 44 Additionally, relieving the State of its 
obligation to pay its fair share of attorney fees 
simply because the Medicaid recipient failed to 
expressly exclude the State's claim would similarly 
defeat the equitable basis of our ruling in McCoy. 
In fact, the Medical Benefits Recovery Act does not 
impose an express exclusion requirement on those 
who wish to proceed with their own claims after the 
State has denied them permission to press the 
State's claim on its behalf. The Act provides: 
A recipient may not file a claim, commence an 
action, or settle, compromise, release, or waive a 
claim against a third party for recovery of medical 
costs for an injury, disease, or disability for which 
the department has provided or has become 
obligated to provide medical assistance, without the 
department's written consent. 
© 2007 Thomson/West. No 
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Utah Code Ann. § 26-19-7(l)(a). 
[15] \ 45 Read in isolation, this language might 
conceivably be understood to imply an express 
exclusion requirement on the basis that such an 
exclusion would be necessary to preserve the State's 
claim. Significantly, however, this section of the 
Act further states that, "[i]f the recipient proceeds 
without the department's written consent as required 
by Subsection (l)(a), the department is not bound 
by any decision, judgment, agreement, or 
compromise rendered or made on the claim or in 
the action,""/. § 26-19-7(2)(a) (emphasis added), 
and that "[t]he department ...retains its right to 
commence an independent action against the third 
party,"id. § 26-19-7(2)(b) (emphasis added). The 
Act thus contemplates that a Medicaid recipient 
may proceed with an independent action in cases 
where the State denies consent to include the State's * 
claim. However, the Act imposes no express 
obligation on the Medicaid recipient to expressly 
exclude the State's claim in such cases. Instead, 
section 26-19-7 itself, by its plain language, serves 
to preserve the State's claim against a third party 
whether or not the Medicaid recipient expressly 
excludes the State's claim from his own action or 
negotiations, putting the third party on notice that, 
in the absence of the State's written consent, the 
State will not be bound by any representations made 
by a Medicaid recipient as to whether the State's 
claim is included, nor will the State be bound by 
any release of claims signed by a Medicaid 
recipient. 
[16] \ 46 We do not interpret this court's opinion 
in McCoy as mandating a contrary conclusion. The 
language in McCoy that might be read to suggest 
that the express exclusion is necessary to preserve 
the State's claim appears in a footnote, which 
refutes the State's argument that McCoy was not 
entitled to attorney fees because he failed to 
cooperate with the State. 2000 UT 39, \ 18 n. 4, 
999 P.2d 572. Had we recognized in that footnote 
that the State's claim was preserved regardless of 
McCoy's express exclusion, our conclusion would 
have been the same. In McCoy, this court stressed 
that "it would be inherently unfair not to award 
attorney fees to McCoy" where he had not only 
requested and been denied the State's consent, but 
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had also taken the additional step of excluding the 
State's claim. Id. ^ 18. As we have explained, 
however, this exclusion was entirely unnecessary to 
preserve the State's claim, and principles of fairness 
thus demand that the State pay its share of attorney 
fees whether or not the Medicaid recipient's 
attorney expressly excludes the State's claim. 
Indeed, we noted in McCoy that the express 
exclusion itself leads to an unfair result whenever 
the State chooses, as it may, to recover its paid 
expenses from the proceeds gained through the 
efforts of the Medicaid recipient's attorney rather 
than through its own independent action. In such a 
situation, the State receives the money to which it is 
entitled, but the Medicaid recipient's net recovery is 
effectively reduced by that amount, and the liable 
third party entirely escapes responsibility for what it 
should have paid to *873 the State. See id. U 18 
n. 5; id. f 22 (Durham, J., concurring). 
[17] U 47 In Straight, 2004 UT 88, 108 P.3d 690, 
this court distinguished the facts of the case before 
it from the facts in McCoy, partly on the basis that 
the attorney for Streight, unlike McCoy, had not. 
expressly excluded the State's claim from the action 
that he filed. See id. ffij 10, 13. However, the 
court's concern in Streight, more broadly described, 
was that an attorney has "[complied with the Act 
by] requesting] consent and has done nothing to 
prejudice the State's right to recover its Medicaid 
payments." Id. U 9. To date, this court has yet to 
analyze whether a Medicaid recipient's failure to 
expressly exclude the State's claim necessarily 
prejudices the State's right to recover. We now do 
so and conclude that it does not. 
K 48 The statutory scheme enacted by the 
legislature grants the State maximum flexibility in 
recovering its Medicaid expenses. It allows the 
State to 
(1) take action directly against the third party, for 
which the State pays its own expenses; (2) grant 
consent to recipients seeking to pursue the State's 
claim, whereby the State's recovery will be reduced 
by reasonable attorney fees and, if any, its 
proportionate share of the costs of an action; or (3) 
refuse consent and proceed against the recipient 
after the recipient recovers from the third party, in 
which case the State's recovery shall be reduced by 
© 2007 Thomson/West. No 
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reasonable attorney fees. 
McCoy, 2000 UT 39, <[ 19, 999 P.2d 572. 
Because the State's flexibility is in no way reduced 
by a Medicaid recipient's failure to expressly 
exclude the State's claims from his own negotiations 
or complaint, there is no justification for requiring 
express exclusion as a prerequisite to the State's 
obligation to pay its share of attorney fees. Indeed, 
imposing such a requirement would serve only to 
benefit a liable third party at the expense of the 
Medicaid recipient. We accordingly hold that the 
State's obligation to pay its share of attorney fees is 
not dependent upon whether the recipient expressly 
excluded the State's claim but, rather, is dependent 
upon whether the recipient requested consent and 
whether the State's recovery was attributable to the 
efforts of the recipient's attorney. 
K 49 Accordingly, in all cases where the State 
satisfies its lien from proceeds procured through the 
efforts of a private attorney, the State is responsible 
for its proportionate share of attorney fees if the 
recipient or his attorney requested consent from the 
State. This is so regardless of whether the State 
satisfies its lien from funds recovered by the 
recipient or whether it recovers directly from a 
liable third party. Moreover, in those cases where 
a settlement or judgment is obtained through the 
efforts of a private attorney, any claim by the State 
that it recovered its lien through its own efforts will 
be subject to scrutiny. The State will not be able to 
establish that it recovered its lien through its own 
efforts simply by showing that it sent notification of 
its lien to potentially liable third parties with the 
expectation that they will pay the State directly 
from the settlement proceeds generated through the 
efforts of a recipient's private attorney. To avoid 
paying its fair share of attorney fees after it has 
refused to grant consent, the State must demonstrate 
that its lien was paid wholly independent of the 
settlement or judgment procured by the recipient's 
private attorney. 
IV. SCOPE OF DISCOVERY ORDER 
H 50 We now turn to the scope of the discovery 
order. The district court limited discovery to that 
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which "relates solely to the class issues" and 
authorized plaintiffs to "pursue the identification of 
recipients who fall within the holding of the McCoy 
case." Because the district court adopted an 
erroneously narrow view of our holding in McCoy, 
it necessarily follows that it unduly restricted the 
scope of discovery. We accordingly remand this 
case to the district court with instructions to modify 
the scope of the discovery order consistent with this 
opinion. 
TJ 51 The district court erred in limiting McCoy to 
its narrow, fact-specific ruling. Under the general 
holding of McCoy, the State is obligated to pay its 
share of a recipient's private attorney fees if either 
(1) the *874 State consents to the recipient's request 
to represent its interest; or (2) the State satisfies its 
lien from proceeds procured through the efforts of a 
recipient's private attorney in those cases where the 
recipient requested, but was denied, consent. We 
remand the case to the district court with* 
instructions to modify the scope of the discovery 
order accordingly. 
U 52 Chief Justice DURHAM, Associate Chief 
Justice WILKINS, Justice DURRANT, and Judge 
ORME concur in Justice PARRISH's opinion. 
TJ 53 Having disqualified himself, Justice 
NEHRING does not participate herein; Court of 
Appeals Judge GREGORY K. ORME sat. 
Utah,2005. 
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MEMORANDUM DECISION (Not For Official 
Publication) 
PER CURIAM: 
*1 Cheryl Carsten seeks to cross-appeal the trial 
court's order dated January 24, 2006. This is before 
the court on its own motion for summary 
disposition based on the lack of jurisdiction due to 
an untimely filed notice of cross-appeal. 
It is undisputed that Carsten filed her notice of 
cross-appeal fifteen days after Brian Carsten filed 
his notice of appeal. Pursuant to rule 4(d), if a party 
files a timely notice of appeal, "any other party may 
file a notice of appeal within 14 days after the date 
on which the first notice of appeal was filed."Utah 
© 2007 Thomson/West. No 
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R.App. P. 4(d). Under the plain language of rule 
4(d), Carsten's notice of cross-appeal was untimely. 
See id. As a result, this court lacks jurisdiction over 
the cross-appeal. SeeGlezos v. Frontier Invs., 826 
P.2d 1230, 1233 (Utah Ct.App.1995). 
Carsten asserts that her notice of cross-appeal was 
timely because three days should be added to the 
time period to file under rule 22 of the Utah Rules 
of Appellate Procedure. SeeUtah R.App. P. 22(d). 
The filing of notices of appeal and cross-appeal, 
however, are beyond the scope of rule 22. Pursuant 
to rule 22, when a party "is required or permitted to 
do an act within a prescribed period after service of 
a paper and the paper is served by mail, 3 days shall 
be added to the prescribed period."/*/. By its plain 
language, rule 22 extends the time to respond to 
documents only where the time runs from the " 
service of [the] paper." Id. 
The time for filing a notice of cross-appeal, 
however, runs from the date of the filing of the 
notice of appeal. SeeUtah R.App. P. 4(d). Because 
the time does not run from the service of the notice 
of appeal, but from the filing of it in court, rule 22 
does not apply. Therefore, Carsten's notice of 
cross-appeal was untimely. 
When a court lacks jurisdiction over a cross-appeal, 
it must dismiss the cross-appeal. SeeBradbury v. 
Valencia, 2000 UT 50, | 8, 5 P.3d 649. 
Accordingly, this cross-appeal is dismissed. 
Utah App.,2006. 
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Not Reported in P.3d, 2006 WL 1791391 (Utah 
App.), 2006 UT App 275 
END OF DOCUMENT 
to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works. 
http://web2.westlaw.com/print/printstream.aspx?prft=HTMLE&destina 11/19/2007 
